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**DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE:
A COMPARISON OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND
SLOVAKIA IN NATO ENLARGEMENT**

by

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December 1998

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ENLARGEMENT**

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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis compares two cases of European democracy and security to explain why the Czech Republic was invited to join NATO and why Slovakia was excluded from the Euro-Atlantic integration. This thesis further discusses the political and economic character of Slovakia and the proposed reforms of Slovak policy to join NATO and the European Union in the near future.

When Czechoslovakia split into two independent states, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, on January 1, 1993, both were believed to have a good chance of integrating into the West's political and military organizations at the earliest opportunity. While the Czech Republic forged ahead with democratic and free market reforms and successfully completed NATO accession talks, Slovakia failed to achieve these important objectives. Because of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar's anti-democratic statecraft, Slovakia has lately been excluded from the enlargement process. This policy led Slovakia slowly and non-democratically toward an authoritarian regime and dictatorship.

However, the 1998 September Parliamentary elections have changed the political face of Slovakia and the new Prime Minister, Mikuláš Dzurinda's government, has aided Slovakia's integration to NATO and the EU.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis, *Democracy and Security in Central Europe: A Comparison of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in NATO Enlargement*, examines the rebirth of democracy in these nations after their separation on January 1, 1993. This thesis also traces their transition from post-Communist regimes to democratic regimes, and their path from the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization (WPTO) to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Initially, this thesis details the common historical background of Czechs and Slovaks and examines the causes for Czechoslovakia dissolution into the Czech Republic and Slovakia. This thesis then suggests that persisting nationalistic tendencies and misconceived economic reforms prompted by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar led Slovakia by 1995/1995 to dictatorship, political failure, and the nation's exclusion from Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The Czech-Slovak separation resulted not only because of historical and economic differences between the two nations, but also for two other primary reasons:

- a) The Czech Republic made vast, sweeping, and rapid economic reforms, including a great privatization process. Such changes were highly attractive to NATO and other alliances. While as the same time, the Czech republic avoided the democratic piteous that emerged in Slovakia.
- b) The Slovak leader, Mečiar, called for more government autonomy, a slowing of both privatization and economic reforms, while he undermined the establishment of democratic principles in their nation. Such quasi-dictatorial leadership excluded Slovakia from NATO and the European Union (EU).

To explore this subject, this thesis employs and adopts three primary theories as espoused by the authors of three outstandingly perceptive works on this subject: first, the theory of the systematic comparative analysis of the process of democratic consolidation in post-Communist Europe, as detailed in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's book, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*; second, the theory of the "triple transition" (democratization, marketization, and a national transformation) in Czechoslovakia's post-Communist period that has determined the dynamics between the state and nation, as presented in Carol Skalnik Leff's book, *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State*; finally, the theory of the "effective" democratic civilian control of the military in Jeffrey Simon's book, *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*.

The introductory chapter of this thesis mainly discusses all the issues regarding the Czech Republic and Slovakia's transitions to democracy and their route to NATO. The second chapter chronicles nearly three decades of Czechoslovakia's historical background until it culminated in independent Czech-Slovak statehoods. Such historical knowledge is essential to this study. This is true, for to compare the Czech Republic and Slovakia in their transition to democracy and to compare their two widely different paths toward democratic consolidation and NATO integration after the Communist collapse, we must understand their social, cultural, and economic differences.

The third chapter combines all of the three above mentioned state transition theories and analyzes Czechoslovakia's return to democracy after almost forty-one

years. Examining two different transition paths to democracy, I argue that while the Czech Republic seems to be a healthy, competitive, fully-functioning democracy, Slovakia with Prime Minister Mečiar's governing style, does not.

The fourth chapter mainly discusses the chronological events of NATO enlargement and the pros and cons, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia's effort for NATO membership. Again, while the Czech Republic "has served as a political role model for Central and Eastern Europe,"¹ Slovakia as one among the first potential "hot" candidates of the so called "Visegrád Group," was excluded from NATO and the EU because they did not meet the minimal requirements for early NATO membership.

Finally, in the case of Slovakia and its reaction to a general exclusion from Euro-Atlantic integration owing to anti-democratic policies, the fifth chapter discusses the political and economic impact on Slovakia and the nation's proposed policy reforms to join NATO and the EU in the near future.

Quite clearly, Slovakia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions interests and benefits all Central European countries. All Visegrad countries understand and concede that if Slovakia becomes a part of the same institutions more military security and political and economic stability will be established in the whole region, and perhaps even worldwide.²

¹ Franklin D. Kramer, "Franklin D. Kramer, "Prepared Statement of Franklin D. Kramer...." *Federal News Service*, 23 October 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [15 April 1998], p. 3.

² "Stredoeuropskí prezidenti podporujú Slovensko (Central-European's Presidents Support Slovakia)." 13 October 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/aarticle.asp?dat=427&id=62517>> [15 October 1998], p. 1.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the last ten years, no part of the world has changed more radically than Central and Eastern Europe. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, authors of *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, the first book that grounded post-Communist Europe within the literature of democratic theory in comparative politics, noted, “Where there were nine states in 1989, there are now twenty-seven, fifteen of them successor states of the USSR.”³ Many of these new countries have emerged without knowing a democratic tradition. Certainly, all these new states have appeared amid profound changes in their economies, political systems, and societies. The transition of these countries to new political systems has created many new opportunities but has also led to new instability and uncertainties.

In the case of the successor states to the former Czechoslovakia, this study analyzes the interaction of the European states, democratic consolidation, and domestic politics in the enlargement of Atlantic security and the defense institutions, such as NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), and the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), into central Europe. In this connection, the striking manner in which certain central European states, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, have succeeded in their quest to join NATO, while the Slovak Republic

³ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Post-Communist Europe: The Most Complex Paths and Tasks,” *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 232.

(Slovakia), Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria have failed to do so, cries out for scholarly analysis.

Further, as of this writing, NATO remains open to new members, so an understanding of the cause and effect of successful or unsuccessful integration of NATO has especially great interest to makers of policy. In this spirit, the author, who has witnessed and participated in the effort of the Czech Republic to join NATO, has undertaken a comparison of Czech and Slovak policy regarding the NATO enlargement.

Ten years ago, nobody could have predicted that the former Soviet allies and the former Warsaw Pact nations the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland would be invited into the NATO military alliance. Yet now NATO's receptive policy has led to its expansion right up to the western frontiers of the former Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, three Central-European countries were supposed to join NATO: Czechoslovakia (which was divided into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in 1993), Poland, and Hungary in the early 1990s. However, Slovakia with its controversial Prime Minister, Vladimír Mečiar, and Chairman of HZDS ("Movement for Democratic Slovakia"), began to fall behind the other countries' movements toward democracy mainly because of many disruptions in the democratization process.

After Slovakia achieved its independence at the start of 1993, it went through several political problems and government crises from 1995 through 1998, and especially in the middle of 1998, that slowed or perhaps completely halted the inception of democracy in the country. These disruptions were attributable to a) the authoritarian style of Mečiar's leadership, b) the Referendum on Slovakia's non-entrance into NATO and

the non-direct election of the President on May 23 and 24, 1997, that was craftily undermined by the government. Many other government anti-democratic activities, such as Prime Minister Mečiar's attempts to censor the media, to restrict minority opposition parties, and to politicize the Slovak Armed Forces prior to the last Slovak election in September 1998, definitely moved Slovakia away from the first wave of NATO enlargement. These anti-democratic policies of Prime Minister Mečiar also isolated Slovakia from the other post-Communist Central and Eastern European countries. Furthermore, soon after the separation of Czechoslovakia in 1993, Slovakia distinguished itself from its Czech neighbor in entirely negative ways, missing the first step toward NATO and the EU and souring its relationship with the leaders of the two organizations by blaming the "EU and NATO exclusion on ignorance...without adequate knowledge about Slovakia."⁴

While some could argue that both the Czech Republic and Slovakia were good candidates to join NATO from 1993 to 1995, NATO's Madrid Summit, two years later, excluded Slovakia and other Eastern European countries and invited only three countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. The US Ambassador in Slovakia, Ralph Johnson, clearly stated in his speech on July 14, 1997, why the United States could not support Slovakia's entry into NATO in its first wave of enlargement. According to this speech, Slovakia was excluded mainly because of its disturbing anti-democratic

⁴ "Slovakia Blames EU, NATO Exclusion on Ignorance," 17 July 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.centreurope.com/ceo/news/98071703.html> [30 July 1998], p. 1.

developments. These problems can be divided into the three following areas: a) the intolerant and unfair treatment of those with politically opposing points of view b) the increasing centralization of power, and c) the misuse of state institutions.⁵

Presently, for Slovakia and other excluded countries, NATO is assembling a package of measures aimed at reassuring them that the newly-established Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) will strengthen political consultations and military cooperation. Such a program will also enhance the role of Partnership for Peace (PfP) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to help Slovakia and other countries meet the standard requirements for another wave of NATO enlargement when they are prepared to join.

From 1996 to 1998, there has been much discussion in the US and Europe over NATO enlargement. The above-mentioned measures are intended to promote democracy and stability in Central and Eastern Europe. By supporting and encouraging Slovakia's effort to move toward a stable democracy and market economy, the Western democracies and other Central European countries can help Slovakia achieve its important objectives--the top Slovak foreign policy priority--of joining the emerging transatlantic security architecture. Indeed, supporting these new democracies in Eastern Europe will bring more security and stability to the region. In keeping with NATO policy, "NATO's door

⁵ Ralph Johnson, "Door to NATO Will Open to Slovakia in Future," *Amb. Johnson Remarks 7/14 On U.S.-Slovakia Relations*. 16 July 1997. Available [Online]: <<http://pcseunet.cz/97/29/0029ar17.htm>> [26 May 1998], p. 3.

remains open”⁶ to those European countries, which, naturally, meet NATO requirements. Also, from the point of view of the Czech Republic and most other Central and European countries, regarding national security interest, it is essential that Slovakia become a member of the same Euro-Atlantic and European institutions. This is true because as soon as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary enter NATO and the EU, they will be obliged to strengthen their political and economic borders against Slovakia. Such borders may draw another new dividing line in Europe. Moreover, having Slovakia in the same Euro-Atlantic and European institutions is even more important in the midst of the Russian economic collapse because such economic influences can spread beyond Russian boundaries and can negatively impact Slovakia.

Prime Minister Mečiar’s May 1998 visit to Russia prior to Slovakia’s September 1998 elections, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin told Mečiar, “We hope, we really hope so much that it will be you who will win the election. The mutual relationship between our countries is excellent and it would be a pity to change anything,” vividly demonstrated Russia’s persistent interest in the region.⁷

It is important to stress that NATO will keep its door open because the continuing process of NATO enlargement will preclude new dividing lines being formed in Europe between those countries that were invited to join NATO and those that were not, as was

⁶ Javier Solana, “NATO and European Security into the 21st Century,” *Speech by Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO to the Oxford University Union Society*. 13 May 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.slovakemb.com/foreign.shtml>> [26 June 1998], p. 4.

⁷ Karel Wolf, “Moskva Jasně naznačila, že drží palce Mečiarovi (Moscow Clearly Indicated That They Were Crossing Their Fingers for Mečiar).” *Dnes*, 29 May 1998, p. 11.

the case with Slovakia, or those, such as, Slovenia and Romania, which continue to work hard to join NATO.

This thesis examines the pros and cons of Slovakia's entry into NATO. The thesis also compares and analyzes two particular cases to explain why the Czech Republic was invited to join NATO while Slovakia was excluded from the Euro-Atlantic integration. In the case of the Czech Republic, the pros and cons of alliance accession have emerged as NATO membership must be the case in a democratic polity. The Czech Republic is convinced that it is more effective and economical to guarantee security when it cooperates with others. Finally, in the case of Slovakia and its reaction to a general exclusion from Euro-Atlantic integration because of its anti-democratic policies, this thesis will discuss the political and economic impact on Slovakia and the proposed reforms of Slovak policy to join NATO and the EU in the near future. Regarding these issues, this thesis also analyzes the debates among international political elites, as well as public opinion.

For Slovakia, integration into the Western structures, NATO, and the Western and European Union has been an essential post-Cold War foreign policy. Slovakia considers NATO as the most effective security structure in Europe and has expressed a strong interest in NATO membership. Former Slovak President Michal Kováč, during his second visit to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on October 17, 1996, stated:

I would like to emphasize that the Slovak Republic shares the same values that are recognized by developed democratic states—the member countries of the Alliance.... Therefore the primary effort of the Slovak Republic is the striving to join the transatlantic community of democratic, stable, and prosperous countries...and I believe [the Slovak Republic] will continue to take all necessary steps leading to the gaining of our full membership in the alliance in the first wave of its enlargement.... We know about several of our problems which will call forth certain doubts about our further direction. These questions are the subject of discussion, polemics, and hard criticism. We regard them as a temporary phenomenon. They are solvable in a constitutional and democratic way.⁸

Only six months after he gave this speech, Slovak President Kováč made a crucial mistake and allowed one nationwide referendum on the direct elections of the President (one ticket with one question about the President elections) and another referendum on the entrance of the Slovak Republic to NATO (one ticket with three questions about NATO) at the same time. On March 13, 1997, the Slovak President announced the referendum for the May 23 and 24, 1997, with one ticket on which all four questions were combined. Total chaos came over the country when the Minister of the Interior cancelled a distribution of the tickets with four questions and ordered the printing and distribution of the tickets with three questions, which was illegal.⁹ The failure of the Slovak government policy to follow constitutional laws in the referendum was considered a monumental problem of both Slovak politics and leadership. This anti-democratic centralization of power finally excluded Slovakia from NATO and the EU in 1997.

⁸ Michal Kováč, "Address By H.E. Michal Kováč, President of the Slovak Republic," 17 October 1996. Available [Online]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961017a.htm>> [30 August 1998], pp. 1-5.

⁹ Miroslav Šedivý, "Referendum in Slovakia (23rd – 24th May 1997)," 19 – 26 May 1997. Available [Online]: <<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/7502/referend.html>> [25 August 1998], pp. 1-5.

However, the September 1998 Slovak Parliamentary elections clearly showed the Slovak public's disagreement with such a government policy that slowly and non-democratically led the country toward a dictatorship. Slovak citizens, calling for extensive political changes and an improvement in the Slovak reputation among the Western democracies, voted for reestablishing democratic principles in the country once again and took another fundamental step in Slovak history. "It's a new epoch, a new start.... Slovakia will show Europe and the world a new face," declared Mikuláš Dzurinda, chairmen of the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK) and, later, new Slovak Prime Minister, immediately after the elections.¹⁰

¹⁰ Siegfried Mortkowitz, "Slovakia's Democratic Revolution." 30 September. Available [Online]: <<http://www.praguepost.cz/archive/news93098a.html>> [30 November 1998], pp. 1-2.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND – THE END OF CZECHO-SLOVAK STATEHOOD

Once a nation is constituted, its people start to feel the necessity of its statehood, and this naturally applies to the Czechs and Slovaks as well. Due to their historical development, the theoretical and philosophical bases for Czech and Slovak statehood differed.¹¹ – Jan Rychlík

An understanding of Czech and Slovak history involves both their efforts to build their nations and their place in the international security system. Such knowledge of the past is essential to this analysis.

To compare the Czech Republic and Slovakia in their transitions to democracy and to compare their two widely different paths toward democratic consolidation and NATO integration after the Communist collapse, we must examine the historical background of these two newly-founded republics to better understand their social, cultural, and economic differences.

Thus the first three sections of this chapter will provide a brief historical summary of Czechoslovakia, and of both the Czech Republic and Slovak “exceptionalism.”¹² This historical overview will be divided into three sections. The first will cover the post-World War I period, and the second section will examine the post-World War II period.

¹¹ Jan Rychlík, “National Consciousness and the Common State (A Historical-Ethnological Analysis),” in Jiří Musil, ed., *The End of Czechoslovakia* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 99.

¹² Kusý uses the term “Exceptionalism” to indicate several stereotypes of the Slovak’s position in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to point out the Slovak’s differences from the Czechs. See Miroslav Kusý, “Slovak Exceptionalism,” in Jiří Musil, ed., *The End of Czechoslovakia* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 139.

The third and final section will examine the collapse of communism in Czechoslovakia and the end of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

The study of contemporary history gives us not only knowledge about world politics and societies, but it also enlightens us about the evolution of societies and the militaries. Such a study can help us analyze and even to predict, in some way, further developments of the modern world. As we think about social changes and events, we can always find some continuity between the past and the present.

In my opinion, a lot of modern research on the Czech Republic and Slovakia suggests that social, cultural, historical and economic differences between the Czech and Slovak nations not only led former Czechoslovakia to its division into two separate states in 1939 and again in 1993 but also led to Slovakia's problems of statehood. Recently, these problems contributed to the anti-democratic development in Slovakia and to its exclusion from the first wave of NATO enlargement and the European Union, which is more fully discussed in the third and fourth chapters of this thesis.

Czechoslovakia as a small state in the heart of Europe played a significant role in European history. Josef Kalvoda in his book *The Genesis of Czechoslovakia* points out:

Indeed, the history of the Czech and Slovak peoples has been intimately linked with the history of all Europe, and all the upheavals that have affected this small country in the heart of Europe have had international repercussions. The Munich crisis of 1938, the events of February 1948 [Communist coup in Czechoslovakia], and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 provide proof of the above observations which have been valid in the past, are valid today, and will remain valid in the future.¹³

This second chapter presents a historical chronology of the Czech and Slovak Republic from the time they proclaimed the first common state, the Czechoslovak Republic, in 1918 to their separation into two republics, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, in 1993. Today, as of this writing, when Czechs and Slovaks are celebrating the 80th anniversary of Czechoslovak independence on October 28, 1998, many Czechs and Slovaks now question whether it was right to divide the common state and whether it would have been better for the two nations to remain whole. This chapter will stress the most important milestones in the Czech-Slovak common history and point out some differences between the Czechs and Slovaks that led to the different political outcomes. First, this chapter will discuss the European security order that enabled Czechs and Slovaks to create the independent state of Czechoslovakia, later shattered by Nazi Germany. Secondly, this chapter will analyze the period of Communist influence in the country. Finally this chapter will discuss the Communist collapse in the country and the

¹³ Josef Kalvoda, "Introduction," *The Genesis of Czechoslovakia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 1.

division of Czechoslovakia after almost seventy-five years of being the dual Czech and Slovak states.

A. THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC IN THE POST-WORLD WAR I ERA

After the First World War (1914-1918), the Bismarckian security system had vanished. The system from 1815 to 1914, sometimes called the “balance-of-power system,” the system in which “power is distributed among several nations with approximate equality,”¹⁴ had completely disintegrated.¹⁵ This disintegration happened not only because the First World War had shown the failure of the international security system of secret alliances and diplomacy among the five powers (Great Britain, France, the German Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire), but also because of the destruction of the German, Russian, and Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The German and Russian Empire succumbed to revolution and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire had shattered into its constituent parts (Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania).¹⁶ Yet, fortunately, possibilities for creating a new “effective” security system then appeared.

¹⁴ Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Balance of Power,” in Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein and Jay M. Shafritz, ed., *Classic Readings of International Relations* (New York: Harcourt Brace Publishers, 1994), p. 206.

¹⁵ Gordon A. Craig and Alexandr L. George, “Balance of Power, 1815-1914: Three Experiments,” *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 39-41.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 44.

In January 1919, hoping to bar such human and material disasters that ensued from World War I, seventy delegates from twenty-seven victorious nations together with hundreds of advisors, clerks, and journalists participated in the Paris Peace Conference with one primary intention: to establish a new global peace that would inhibit other nations from warring against one other.¹⁷ Nevertheless, an ulterior purpose also existed at the Paris Peace Conference. The victorious powers desired not only to build peace and construct a new international system, but they also desired to reorganize the territories of Europe. Moreover, they sought compensation, retribution, and punishment of the defeated powers.

In 1918 and 1919 the most-asked questions confronting peacemakers were similar to those asked today. These questions are 1) How can a new security system be established in Europe? 2) How can a new international order based on international rule of law be reestablished? Constructing a new international security structure was extremely difficult because Germany was not allowed to become a member of the League of Nations until 1926, nor the Soviet Union until 1934.¹⁸ The situation was also complicated by nationalistic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe. For example in democratic Czechoslovakia, while Czechs had to deal with the German minority in the Sudetenland, Slovaks had to fight for their independence from the Magyars.

¹⁷ William R. Keylor, "The Peace of Paris and New International Order," *The Twentieth-Century World: An International History*, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 72.

¹⁸ Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, "System-Building, 1919-1939," *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 45.

At the Paris Conference, Premier Clemenceau of France and other French delegates supported treaties based on the hundred-year-old system of the balance of power and of alliances. However, US President, Woodrow Wilson, who personally participated in the Paris conference, did not support this idea. He called for a “peace without victory” instead of a “balance of power.” On January 22, 1917, in his speech to the United States Senate on the essentials of peace Wilson declared: “There must be not a balance of power but a community of power.”¹⁹ Wilson’s Fourteen Points will be discussed in slightly more detail in the next section of this chapter.

Wilson wished to establish a community of free nations, a League of Nations, with peaceful relations with each other. At the end of the conference, Wilson succeeded with the inception of the League of Nations but was less successful with his program for world peace—the Fourteen Points that he declared during his address to the Congress on January 8, 1918.²⁰

However, the League of Nations as a newly-formed institution was very weak and because of the absence of two major powers, Germany and the Soviet Union, the US Senate dismissed the League of Nation, labeling it “a conspiracy to involve Americans in the corrupt old system of secret treaties and irresponsible commitments.”²¹

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 46.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 47.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

Because of these absences and the British disrespect for the rights of small nations in the newly-developing international system based on the peaceful principles of the League of Nations, the French began to build up their own security system, similar to the old alliance system, which had been preferred by French Premier Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

Thus, France began to build up alliances with Belgium and Poland, and the so-called "Little Entente" was signed on August 14, 1920. The Little Entente consisted of three countries, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Because France could not support its eastern allies sufficiently (owing to the high cost of military assistance), an alliance "cordon sanitaire" was directed against Russia and Germany. Thus, the French system, after the British isolation from the France-German conflict "that had resulted from a French attempt to prevent Germany from overrunning its eastern ally," was not effective enough to prevent Germany from invading France's allies.²² As Germany's domination grew more threatening in the 1930's, Czechoslovakia also signed a pact with the Soviet Union to help Czechoslovakia in case it was needed. However a previous agreement between France and Czechoslovakia had obligated France to help Czechoslovakia before the Soviet Union took action.

Of course, the French system of alliance and British isolation did not stop the aggressive tendencies of fascism in Italy in 1922, in Japan in 1937, and in Germany in 1933. As a consequence, these events weakened the French system so remarkably that

²² Ibid., p. 48.

when Poland signed the Nazi-Polish Pact with Germany in 1934, the system *de facto* ceased to exist.²³

After the infamous 1938 Munich Agreement, there was little left of the new, ineffective post-WWI international system that could stop German aggression, and so another military conflict escalated into the Second World War, in 1939. After exactly twenty years of a successful democracy in Czechoslovakia, the Munich Agreement temporarily dismembered the first Czechoslovak Republic and the Czech nation.

Czechoslovakia's effort to become an independent republic consisting of two major nations, Czech and Slovak, is discussed below.

1. Proclamation of Czechoslovakia's Independence in 1918: Czech and Slovak Domestic Politics

The turn of the nineteenth century brought the Czech National Revival, which was a significant milestone in the restoration of Czech statehood and later in the building of the first independent Czechoslovakia.²⁴ On July 3, 1866, when Austria suffered heavy losses in the war with Bismarck's Prussia in the Battle of Sadová near the Bohemian town of Hradec Kralové, Austria *de facto* lost its existence and became an ally of Prussianized Germany. Then, in 1867, the Habsburgs transformed the Austrian Empire into the dual Austro-Hungarian Empire and constitutional monarchy.

²³ Ibid., p. 49.

²⁴ Petr Čornej, "Turn of 19th Century Beginnings of the Czech National Revival," *Fundamentals of Czech History* (Prague: Práh Publishers, 1992), p. 35.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, all the lands of Czech and Slovak were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the framework of the Habsburg confederation. The changes of the international system that took place during the Czech National Revival and the First World War contributed to the breakdown of the Habsburg monarchy that enabled the rise of the new states such as Czechoslovakia, Germany, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Romania. Independent Czechoslovakia, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia, part of Silesia, Slovakia, and Carpatho-Ruthenia (Sub-Carpathian Russia) rose from the remains of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire right after the First World War. Yet the first pro-independence movement of Czechs and Slovaks started long before the First World War had even begun and the onset for autonomy was known as the Czech National Revival Movement. The dominant political leaders of the Czech Revival were “liberals” František Palacký, with his son-in-law František Ladislav Rieger, Karel Havlíček Borovský, and Josef Jungman, who put together the first Czech dictionary. At that time the first Czech political parties, the “Old Czech,” led by Palacký, who were not overly opposed to remaining within the Habsburg Empire, and the “Young Czech,” led by Rieger, who were a radical, more liberal party, were founded.

In 1848-1849 František Palacký was also one of the most original thinkers who wished to reform Austria by giving it a new ideology for its existence. In 1865, in his work *The Idea of the Austrian State*, he made several suggestions for Austria’s reorganization. George J. Koytun describes Palacký’s ideas as a wish of those who wanted reforms within the Austrian monarchy:

In 1848-1849 Palacký thought that Austria might be transformed into ethnic-historical groups of territories in which the Czech population of the Czech lands would be joined by the Slovaks. Frustrated in his hopes, he put more emphasis on so-called “historical rights” and in [his work], *The Idea of the Austrian State*, demanded a federation of territorial units according to ethnographic, geographic and historical principles.²⁵

In contrast to Slovakia, after the 1878 crisis in the Balkans, and by the end of the final decade of the 19th century, Czech society already had nearly all the features of a modern, developed society. As J.V. Polišenský described in his book *History of Czechoslovakia in Outline*, when the Czechs and Southern Slavs went into the Balkans to fight against German expansion and to help organize the new states of Serbia and Bulgaria, the situation in Slovakia was growing worse and worse and the transformation of industry and society was not as progressive as it was in the Czech lands. Polišenský wrote:

The Slovak stress on their linguistic individuality and their independence from the rebellious Czechs did not help. From 1874 (to the end of World War I) the Slovaks had no secondary schools, their national societies were being prohibited, their poets were growing to be addicts of mysticism and frustration.²⁶

The situation in Slovakia, which was a part of Hungary within the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, was much different. Slovakia's only education and culture program,

²⁵ George J. Kovtun, “T.G. Masaryk: The Problem of a Small Nation,” in H. Gordon Skilling, ed., *Czechoslovakia 1918-1988* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 27.

²⁶ J.V. Polišenský, “The Fight for National Freedom.” *History of Czechoslovakia in Outline* (Prague: Bohemia International Press, 1991), p. 6.

called "Matica Slovenská," established in 1860's was soon prohibited. Hungarians also prohibited the use of the Slovak language in 1975. However, it would be incorrect to say that an educational system did not exist in Slovakia.²⁷

Because there were more intellectuals in Czech lands than in Slovakia, a number of rival political factions, such as the conservative Old Czechs and liberal Young Czechs, the Czech Social Democratic Party (founded in 1878), the progressives, the Agrarian party, the Christian Socialists, the National Socialists, and the Radical Progressives showed the complex social stratification. The first general elections to Parliament that took place, in 1907, showed that the Agrarians and Social Democrats were the strongest Czech parties.

In 1882 a new academic generation was emerging from the Czech University of Prague—for example, the Czech University professor, philosopher, and politician, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, a successor of Palacký, who had been pushing even more the pro-independence movement for the Czechs and Slovaks.

²⁷ Owen V. Johnson, "Education and the Making of a Nation," *Slovakia 1918-1938* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 29.

After Palacký, Masaryk was the outstanding architect of Czech moral rearmament, no matter how controversial his views were. Imagine this: in this great, disjointed, aimless Empire ruled by the Habsburgs, Palacký and, in his footsteps, Masaryk, gave the small Czech nation a great idea and clear orientation. The history of the Czech nation, they taught, is a meaningful part of world history. The Czechs deserved recognition as the carriers of universal values in view of their struggle for spiritual freedom. In this way Palacký, with Masaryk as his successor, linked Czech historical and existence efforts to human progress and the quest for democracy.²⁸

Both Palacký and Masaryk wanted to establish a Czech state in the Austrian federation. Like Palacký, Masaryk realized that this idea together with pro-Austrian activities was rather more unrealistic than unsuccessful. “The problem of Austria was the problem of the emancipation of many nations but for the Czech the problem was the Germans.”²⁹ The Germans who were minorities living in the Czech lands never agreed with the idea of restoring the Czech state in the Austrian Empire.³⁰

The Balkans crisis from 1907 to 1914 resulted in the tension between Vienna and Belgrade over Bosnia Herzegovina. When the imperial successor to the Austrian-Hungarian throne, Austrian Crown-Prince Francis Ferdinand d’Este, was assassinated in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, the immediate war on Serbia declared by Germany escalated

²⁸ George J. Kovtun, “T.G. Masaryk: The Problem of a Small Nation,” in H. Gordon Skilling, ed., *Czechoslovakia 1918-1988* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 29.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 32.

³⁰ Ibid.

to the First World War in July 1914. These events without any doubt helped advance the final realization of long-held Czech aspirations for its independence.³¹

At the very beginning of the First World War, the Czechs became unified in their opposition to the Austrian-Hungarian government. Austria-Hungary's alignment with Germany led to the restriction of democratic rights in the Czech lands and the arrest of the Czech politicians. A quick German victory would increase German domination in Central Europe, so Czech and Slovak soldiers refused to fight against other Slavs and deserted to the Russians and later to the Italians. At the same time, many representatives of the opposition, including the leader of the small "Realistic Party," T.G. Masaryk, left the country. Masaryk left in December of 1914 for London, where he, in official Czech resistance against Vienna, continued to fight for Czechoslovakian independence throughout the war.

It was during that exile when T.G. Masaryk first came up with the idea of creating a joint country together with the neighboring land of Slovakia that had been ruled by Hungarians for centuries. He worked closely with other members of the opposition, Czech lawyer Dr. Edward Beneš, author of a book with the "uncompromising title: *Détruisez l' Austriche-Hongrie*" (*Destroy Austria-Hungary!*) (1916), and Slovak astronomer M.R. Štefánik, who was active in Paris.³²

³¹ J.V. Polišenský, "The Fight for National Freedom," *History of Czechoslovakia in Outline* (Prague: Bohemia International Press, 1991), p. 104.

³² Ibid., p. 106.

Czech and Slovak soldiers who fought alongside the allies, France, Great Britain, Italy, and later the US, also contributed to the Czechoslovakian independence. At the beginning of 1915, these Czechs and Slovaks soldiers formed the first Czechoslovak military units, the Czechoslovak Legions, which went to Serbia to fight German and Austro-Hungarian troops. They even fought against Bolshevik forces in Russia.

In 1916, the three political leaders, T.G. Masaryk, Beneš, and Štefánik founded abroad the Czech National Council, which later was renamed the Czechoslovak National Council and was recognized as the first government of Czechoslovakia by Allies leaders in 1918. In 1917, T.G. Masaryk went to the US where he continued his political initiative.

On January 18, 1918, President Wilson proclaimed his famous program for world peace, the Fourteen Points, which called for “open covenants of peace,” a readjustment of European boundaries on the principles of “independent determination,” an “opportunity of autonomous development” of Austria-Hungary, and the establishment of a “general association of nations … for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”³³ Following this proclamation, the Czechs and Slovaks who were seeking autonomy signed the “Treaty of

³³ Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points,” in Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein and Jay M. Shafritz, *Classic Readings of International Relations*, ed., (Orlando: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1994), pp. 18-20.

Pittsburgh" which formed a joint state composed of two nations, Czech and Slovak. This was signed at Independence Hall in Philadelphia in May 1918.³⁴

When the situation was quite apparently not in German and Austria-Hungary's favor and as they anticipated defeat, the first Czechoslovak Republic was declared, on October 28, 1918, and on November 14, 1918, T.G. Masaryk was elected Czechoslovakia's first President by the National Assembly (the Parliament). Slovakia joined the common state on October 30, 1918, by the Turčianský Svätý Martin's Declaration. As Stanislav J. Kirschbaum pointed out in his book *The Czechoslovak Orientation*, "The formation of the new state, which included Slovakia, became a matter that concerned primarily Czech politics."³⁵ Because the Czechoslovak Republic was a multi-ethnic state composed of the Czechs and Slovaks nations, and German, Polish, Hungarian, and Ruthenian minorities, the first months of the state were by no means easy.

For instance, Germans and Hungarians protested persistently against being governed by the Czechs and Slovaks within the Czechoslovak Republic. This relationship caused an uneasy situation during the birth of the first Czechoslovak Republic. As R. A. C. Parker, author of a book, *The Second World War*, noted, the new boundaries gave not only more reason for German "xenophobic nationalism," but it also made some Germans dislike the "continued separation of German-speaking Austrians

³⁴ John O. Crane and Sylvia Crane, "Masaryk in America," *Czechoslovakia* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), p. 55.

³⁵ Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "The Czechoslovak Orientation," *A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 151.

from Germany and the rule of Czechs over Germans following the breakup of the Habsburg monarchy and the creation of Czechoslovakia.”³⁶

Because both the society and industry in the Czech lands were among the most advanced in Europe, Czechoslovakia quickly became one of the strongest economic states among the world’s ten most developed industrial-agrarian countries. The Škoda plant in Pilsen, for example, had been the most important armaments industry in the monarchy. Since that time, we have continually observed significant economic, cultural, and industrial differences between the two nations, Czechs and Slovaks, that decided to live in one state—Czechoslovakia.

The Czech lands, Moravia, and part of Silesia were more developed than Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia because the first three regions belonged to the Austrian part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, one of the most industrially developed parts of Europe. However, the latter belonged to the Hungarian part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the most agrarian lands of Central and Eastern Europe. These two different regions were also ruled by different sovereigns and had different national interests and different cultural orientations. Further, the composition of intellectuals and a well-educated public was vastly different in these two states. In my opinion, these basic differences between the Czech and Slovak regions explain some of the differences between Czech and Slovak

³⁶ R.A.C. Parker, “Hitler, Germany, and the Origins of the European War.” *The Second World War: A Short History*, rev. ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 2.

societies. As Hugh Seton-Watson argues, “the Slovak people were both economically and politically primitive.” As soon as Slovaks became independent from Hungary within the young Czechoslovak Republic, national problems appeared. Because there were few qualified Slovak people capable of working in administrative institutions in Slovakia, in spite of the famous Pittsburgh Agreement promising Slovaks a “Slovak Diet, autonomous administration and law courts, and the use of the Slovak language as an official language in public affairs and schools in Slovakia,” many Czechs had to occupy these administration positions.³⁷

Since that time, the beginning of one state with two major ethnic groups, Czechs and Slovaks, can be considered as not only the successful beginning of a democratic Czechoslovak state in Europe but also the beginning of Slovak national self-determination. This would lead to Slovak's independence after the 1938 Munich Agreement that turned Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland over to the Nazi-German Reich, in 1939 and after the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1992.

2. Munich Agreement in 1938

Despite the fact that France had a security agreement and a military treaty with Czechoslovakia, the four great powers at that time, represented by Adolf Hitler (Germany), Neville Chamberlain (Great Britain), Edouard Daladier (France), and Benito Mussolini (Italy), on September 29, 1938, in Munich, Germany, agreed on the cession of

³⁷ Hugh Seton-Watson, “Political Experience, 1918-39: Czech and Slovak,” *Eastern Europe between the Wars 1918-1941* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p. 175.

the border territories of the Czech Lands, the territories which became known as Sudetenland, to Nazi Germany. Although the meeting was to decide about the existence of Czechoslovakia, its representatives were not invited to Munich.

The Munich Agreement meant not only a catastrophic historic and moral disaster for the Czech people but also a grand disappointment for the Czech and Slovak nations in Europe. It also influenced Czechoslovakian behavior in the political field after the Second World War and some of the recent characteristics of the Czech and Slovak peoples. Ignorance about a small nation by the Western countries dismembered the Czechoslovak Republic, which had already established a genuine Parliamentary democracy, guaranteed by the Constitution of February 1920, declared its independence in 1918, and successfully existed for exactly twenty years.³⁸

As a result of the Munich Agreement, Germany annexed thirty-eight percent of the Czech lands, Hungary obtained southern and southeastern regions of Slovakia and Ruthenia, and Poland obtained an eastern part of the Czech lands, and Silesia, the most industrially valuable part, the Těšín region of Silesia.

³⁸ The infamous comment of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who had spoken to his nation in a radio broadcast when he came back from Munich can only prove the British disrespect for the rights of small powers in the newly-developing international system. When Germany was preparing for a war in September 1938, Chamberlain, avoiding a military conflict, stated that "as a man of peace" he could not help Czechoslovakia, "a faraway country." He further said the Czechs and Slovaks were, "people of whom we know nothing." "Europe's New Order: Making a Club, Not War." *The New York Times*, 18 May 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNEWS [28 August 1998].




Figure II-1 A Map of Czechoslovakia in 1938

Source: "Map of Czechoslovakia Showing Sudetenland." 30 April 1998. Available [Online]: <http://sorrel.humboldt.edu/~rescuers/book/Chlup/chlupgif/czechmap2.html> [28 October 1998].

As the map (Figure II-1) shows above, the remainder of Czechoslovakia was transformed into Czechoslovakia.³⁹

Edvard Beneš succeeded T.G. Masaryk, who resigned from office in 1935 due to illness. He stood at the head of the Czechoslovak Republic during the events of 1938 and under international pressure was forced to accept the conclusion of the meeting on September 30, 1938, one day after the Munich Agreement.

Czechoslovakia was simply left abandoned by its allies and there was nothing left to stop the dissolution of the Czechoslovakian state or to stop Nazi Germany from seizing the remainder of the Czechoslovak Republic, Czechoslovakia. The fall of the First

³⁹ Jaroslav Krejčí and Pavel Machonín, "Dismemberment and Restitution: Various Kinds of Authoritarian Rule," *Czechoslovakia 1918-92* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 19.

Czechoslovakian state continued, mostly due to the three factors: firstly, by the dismissal of President Beneš, who had to resign on October 5, 1938, and was exiled to Great Britain; secondly, by the first occupation of the Czech lands in the history of Czechoslovakia, when Hitler crushed the remainder of Czechoslovakia which was militarily well prepared, but which, based on government decisions, did not resist the German invasion. Hence Hitler established the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia as a part of the Great German Reich on March 15, 1939. Then Emil Hácha was made the "President" of the Protectorate. Finally, the Slovak struggle for its autonomy was led by the People's Party of Hlinka in 1928, and succeeded in the proclamation of the first "independence state" of Slovakia (later considered Germany's ally) on March 14, 1939, as Jozef Tiso, a Catholic priest, was named the first Slovak President.

The occupation of the Protectorate of the Czech lands and Moravia was firmly rejected by the Czech population, although pulling together an armed resistance was not in its power. As publisher Lumír Tuček pointed out, although President Beneš was an experienced man in international politics, armed-resistance against Nazi-Germany would have meant suicide for the Czech nation. The fact that Czech Germans who supported Hitler lived as a minority in Sudetenland, which was annexed by Nazi Germany, led President Beneš to decide not to fight the German occupiers. A military confrontation would have had nothing to do with fighting for freedom but rather fighting for ethnic

goals.⁴⁰ However, the demonstration on October 28, 1939, and a demonstration at the funeral of a murdered student, Jan Opletal, were among many Czech protests against the Nazi occupation. This resulted in the closing of Czech universities on November 17, 1939, the example-setting execution of nine student leaders, and the internment of 1,200 college students in concentration camps.

Although the domestic resistance movement continued, it was no match for the practices of the Gestapo and suffered heavy losses. In contrast to the domestic resistance movement, the foreign resistance movement organized by President-in-exile Beneš from London gained a lot of credit. These foreign movements were: 1) Czechoslovakian pilots' participation in the battle of England 2) the assassination of Reich Protector Reinhard Heydrich on May 27, 1942, and 3) the formation of a Czechoslovak military unit in Eastern Europe under the command of Colonel Ludvík Svoboda. This unit first went to battle in the early spring of 1943 and later took part in the liberation of Czechoslovakia alongside the Soviet Army in 1944-45.

A much different situation was developing in Slovakia. In contrast to the Czechoslovak activities led by President Beneš, Slovakia was considered Germany's ally because the Slovak state had supported Hitler from 1939-44. Thus Slovakia in the event of the capitulation of Germany would be considered a defeated country. However, the

⁴⁰ Lumír Tuček, "Mnichov: Hájí Zemi Proti Celé Evropě? (Defend the Country against all Europe?)," *Dnes*, 24 September 1998, p.13.

beginning of the uprising in Slovakia on August 29, 1944, when the Germans retreated on the Eastern Front, improved Slovakia's international reputation.

The southwestern part of Czechoslovakia was actually first liberated by American troops, but because of a prior agreement between the Soviet Union and the US, the American troops could not proceed towards Prague. The Soviet tanks that rolled into Prague only one day after the capitulation of Germany on May 9, 1945, brought the final liberation of Czechoslovakia. Once again, the re-establishment of independent Czechoslovakia, sometimes called the Third Czechoslovak Republic, with President Beneš at its head was announced.

B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA

The restored Second Czechoslovak Republic led by President Beneš significantly differed from the First Republic not only in the geographic contours of the country (the Soviet Union acquired Subcarpathian Russia on June 29, 1945), but also in the national composition of the population. These significant changes in the composition of Czechoslovakian society resulted mainly from the transfer of an estimated three million German inhabitants living on Czech lands and Moravia into defeated Germany. At the same time, by "National Decrees" issued by President Beneš on October 24, 1945, property owned by German collaborators and traitors was confiscated and mines, key industries, banks, and insurance companies were nationalized.⁴¹

⁴¹ Jaroslav Krejčí, "In Frontline Again," *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 175-176.

Even today, the displaced Germans and their descendants who settled in Germany declare their outrage at the event and hope to have their lands returned to them. At times their powerful political lobby has had unfortunate effects on German-Czech relations, even in the last few years.

1. Communist Coup and the End of Democracy in Czechoslovakia in 1948

In Czechoslovakia, only one year later, during the 1946 Parliamentary elections, the Communists took a strong position against political parties compromised of fascists. Communists, who after the German defeat enjoyed the trust of the majority of Czechoslovakians, blamed other political parties for accepting the Munich Agreement and triumphed with forty percent of the vote. In the fall of 1947, the Communists broke the dominance of the Democratic Party in Slovakia and finalized their dominance in a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia on February 25, 1948. Klement Gottwald, who was also Secretary of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party, proclaimed a Communist governmental state of crisis. This forced President Beneš to resign. The Communist coup began in February 1948, when twelve ministers of the governing coalition resigned, protesting the illegal promotion of Communist police officers. On February 20, 1948, President Beneš, rather than calling for new Parliamentary elections as was expected, was forced to fill the vacant positions with Communist candidates. Beneš resigned shortly

after he refused to sign a new constitution guaranteeing a "dominant role" for the Communist Party, which was passed by the Parliament on May 9, 1948.

This Communist victory meant the end of democracy in Czechoslovakia for more than forty years and forced Czechoslovakia's international relations towards the Soviet Union. This Soviet orientation was in reality truly decisive for further anti-democratic developments in Czechoslovakia.

2. Application of the Soviet Experience in Czechoslovakia

Based on the decisions made by the heads of the three victorious powers, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, at the Yalta conference, Czechoslovakia came into the Soviet sphere of influence, and the Communist Party under Gottwald's leadership followed Stalin's directives for a so-called Czechoslovakian path to socialism. Under Communist rule, there was only a single ballot at elections (citizens could only vote for one joint ticket) with a tremendous Communist majority in Parliament, which became merely a formal entity of Communist totalitarianism, supposedly symbolizing the unity of people and state.

About two-thirds of the overall industrial capacity of the country at that time representing more than 3,000 companies and all banks, was nationalized. Also agriculture was forcibly collectivized. All newspapers that were too critical of the leading party were simply forbidden, and regime opponents were sent off to the uranium mining work camps or sentenced to death.

On June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall devised and proposed a plan, later known as the Marshall Plan, offering U.S. assistance to all

European countries. Czechoslovakia was the first to consider accepting the Marshall Plan, but after consultations with Stalin, who in June of 1946 had already refused Soviet participation in the plan, Czechoslovakia refused the aid as well.⁴² In 1949, instead of taking advantage of the Marshall Plan, Czechoslovakia entered into the Soviet-dictated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), and this was followed, in 1955, by Czechoslovakia's entry into the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact which was intended to create a counterbalance to the six-year-old NATO.

The disagreement regarding the Czechoslovakian path to socialism and the restructuring of the "socialist market economy" based on the Stalinist model had increased with both Stalin's and Gottwald's deaths in 1953. When Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev exposed the crimes of Stalinism in 1956, Antonín Novotný, the national Communist party leader, suddenly changed his position and began to call for reform.

3. Invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Armies of Five States of the Warsaw Pact in 1968

In the face of the growing power of reformers calling for political and economic changes in 1960's, the Communists adopted a new constitution and announced the building of "Socialism"—the first step on the road to "genuine" communism—and in

⁴² Ibid., p. 177.

1960 changed the name of the country to “The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic” (CSSR).

But the new constitution and new name of the country could not help to slow the country’s rapid economic decline. At the end of 1967, the conflict between Stalinists and reformers in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party intensified. Then January 1968 culminated in the election of a Slovak Communist, Alexandr Dubček, to the post of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the place of Antonín Novotný, whose presidential post was filled by General Ludvík Svoboda on March 30, 1968, after Novotný resigned on January 4, 1968.

January 1968 came to be known as the beginning of the “Prague Spring” in Czechoslovakia. Reforms brought political, economic, and cultural freedom. Press and television censorship were lifted under Alexandr Dubček’s plan for introducing of “Socialism with a human face.” Dubček’s leadership, an attempt at political and economic reform was undertaken for the first time since 1948. At this time, the government proclaimed the legitimacy of basic human rights and liberties in Czechoslovakia and criticized the policies of the past.⁴³

Unfortunately, the “Prague Spring” was brought to a halt on August 20, 1968 by the military intervention of the five member states of the Warsaw Pact: the USSR and four neighboring “brother states,” Poland, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary,

⁴³ Jaromír Navrátil, Antonín Benčík, Václav Kural, Marie Michálková, and Jitka Vondrová, eds., “A Sun Suddenly Risen a Prelude to the Prague Spring of 1968.” *The Prague Spring 1968* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1998), pp. 1-7.

and Bulgaria. The invasion was justified as the means “to secure the socialist system in Czechoslovakia and to ensure the security of the whole socialist community.”⁴⁴

The Czechs and Slovaks saw the arrival of the Russian tanks with shock and outrage and gave passive and chaotic resistance. Alexandr Dubček and the other Prague Spring leaders were forced to go to Moscow to negotiate the capitulation of Dubček’s government. While they were imprisoned briefly in Moscow, they were forced to sign a defeatist Moscow memorandum in which Czechs and Slovak signatories agreed to the “temporary” presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia.

Although the Western democracies knew in advance about the invasion of Czechoslovakia, nothing could be done to help Czechoslovakia’s first attempt to return to a democratic state. Possible help from the United States, which was engaged in the Vietnam War at that time, or help from other Western democracies could have easily led to a military conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs. This meant that Czechoslovakia was left abandoned by Western democracies once again, as it had been thirty years earlier in the Munich Agreement in 1938.

After the failure of the Prague Spring, Czechoslovak reformists tried to preserve at least some of the achievements of their reform efforts. On October 28, 1968, the Czechoslovak National Assembly approved a new constitutional law on the creation of a

⁴⁴ Jaroslav Krejčí, “In Frontline Again,” *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), pp. 189-190.

Czechoslovak Federation, which was to be divided internally into the two separate Czech and Slovak Republics by January 1, 1969. But two months later, the Federal Assembly adopted a new constitutional law undermining the previous amendment, meaning that the new federation existed in name only.

At that time, many reformers were sentenced to long jail terms, thousands of people were removed from their jobs, and many people from both the civilian or military sectors were expelled from the Communist Party and the army. About 140,000 people emigrated to the west as a result of the failure of the Prague Spring.⁴⁵ Many of those people who stayed behind continued to protest the Soviet invasion. In the most famous of the individual acts of protest, in January 1969, a young philosophy student, Jan Palach, immolated himself in public.

On April 17, 1969, Alexandr Dubček had to resign his office in favor of a Slovak Communist, Gustav Husák, who became General Secretary of the Communist Party. After President Svoboda was forced to resign due to illness, Husák was elected in his place in 1975. Husák's period of the "normalization," from the 1970s to 1989, led to the economic devastation of the country and to the moral decay of society, lasting more than twenty years, during which the republic seemed veritably crippled.

Although Czechoslovakia signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 as one of the thirty-five member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation and agreed to international monitoring of human rights, many violations were reported. The negative

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.191.

developments in Czechoslovakia, including the violation of human rights, opened a “window of opportunity” for opponents of the Communist authoritative regime in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁶

Sidney Tarrow stated that “Once the social movement was created, its challenge shaped the future relations between states and collective action across state boundaries.”⁴⁷ In Czechoslovakia, Charter 77 was the oldest, best-known, and most significant independent social movement. This organization dedicated to the promotion of human rights.⁴⁸ Its members, which included ex-Communists, anti-Communists, Christian dissidents, and secular humanists, intellectuals, artists, and writers, were often jailed, as was the case of the Chartist founding leader, the playwright Václav Havel. Other groups were the Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Prosecuted, the Independent Peace Association, Czech Children, the Movement for Civic Liberty, the Jazz Section, the Club of Friends of the USA, the Ecological Committee, and several smaller groups.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Carol Skalnik Leff, “Czechoslovakia under Communism,” *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1997), p. 61. The Helsinki Rights Accords played a significant role for democratization in Eastern Europe, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 89-94.

⁴⁷ Sidney Tarrow, “State and Social Movements,” *Power in Movement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 62.

⁴⁸ Vladimír V. Kusin, “The Charter,” *From Dubcek to Charter 77* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978), pp. 304-307.

⁴⁹ Ladislav Holý, “Nation against State,” *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 29.

This social movement in Czechoslovakia was accelerated by Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the leadership of the Soviet Union when the reform programs of "perestroika" and "glasnost" took shape.

C. THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Because of these 1989's events in the Soviet Union, human rights violations in Czechoslovakia and the fact that the Communist Party leaders were not able to restructure the worsening socialist economy, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia collapsed and resigned control of the country in November 1989, in response to massive demonstrations. This happened even after the Communist Party made the changes in personnel, such as on the posts of the Communist leadership in which Miloš Jakeš replaced Gustav Husák and became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1987.

1. The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia in November 1989

The Velvet Revolution started on November 17, 1989, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. This revolution began only eight days after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Czech students, "at a regime-approved march to commemorate the first student killed in the Nazi invasion turned the march into an anti-regime demonstration and were brutally beaten by the state police."⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Post-Communist Europe: The Most Complex Paths and Tasks," *Problems Of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 325.

These events led to a general strike and because of the lack of Communist reformers in Czech and Slovak cities all over the country and the military officials' promise that "the army would not fight the people," the Communist regime at the close of 1989 simply collapsed, which was eloquently confirmed by the resignation of Communist President Gustav Husák on December 9, 1989. Václav Havel was then elected as the new President of Czechoslovakia on December 29, 1989.⁵¹

Quickly following these events, Czechoslovak citizens formed two official spoke-groups, "the Civic Forum" (OF) in the Czech lands and "Public against Violence" (VPN) in Slovakia, which in the June 1990 elections overwhelmingly won in both parts of Czechoslovakia. Then, once again, the possibilities of establishing a democratic state based on Western ideologies returned to Czechoslovakia.

2. Withdrawal of the Soviet Troops from Czechoslovakia in 1991

Beside the anti-regime group Charter 77, there were various independent initiatives, which rather than organizing demonstrations against the Communist regime to support their political demands, formulated various petitions publicly well known. For example, on the twentieth anniversary of Czechoslovakia's occupation by the five armies of the Warsaw Pact, in 1988, as Ladislav Holý wrote:

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 327.

The Independent Peace Association was calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, free elections with multiple candidates, the abolition of censorship, the observance of basic human rights in accordance with international agreements signed by the Czechoslovakian government, and the release of all political prisoners.⁵²

These independent initiatives were not as effective as expected because of the Communist repression and prosecution of its leaders. However, the November 1989 events in Czechoslovakia that opened a new chapter in the country's history by returning the democratic traditions of the Masaryk's era also enabled negotiations with the Soviet Union about the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

One of the top "foreign policy priority of the leaders of the Velvet Revolution was to establish Czechoslovakia's sovereignty after long decades of Soviet hegemony."⁵³ As soon as the Soviet leadership during Gorbachev's reforms admitted that the 1968 Czechoslovak invasion was a mistake, Czechoslovak leaders began to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the issue of troop withdrawal since such military forces had no reason to stay in Czechoslovakia any longer. In the beginning of 1990, both sides surprisingly and quickly agreed on the complete withdrawal of the nearly 74,000 Soviet troops by the end of June 1991.⁵⁴ This included 17,000 officers, Soviet nuclear forces with conventional units of 1,220 main battle tanks and 2,505 armored vehicles. The Soviet troops withdrew

⁵² Ladislav Holý, "Nation against State," *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 48-49.

⁵³ Carol Skalnik Leff, "The Search for a New Security Order in International Relations," *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 216-217.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

from eighty-five military bases and left behind them thousands of empty buildings.⁵⁵ According to the withdrawal agreement, the last Soviet tank left Czechoslovakia three months early, on March 27, 1991.⁵⁶

3. Separation of Czechoslovakia in 1992 and 1993

The question of the Czech-Slovak mutual relationship and the coexistence of the two major nations had increased with the nationwide general elections of 1992, when the Czechs overwhelmingly voted for Václav Klaus, the leader of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) established from the Civic Forum (OF), and the Slovaks voted for Vladimír Mečiar, leader of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) established from the Public Against Violence (VPN). This led to the peaceful separation of Czechoslovakia into two separate independent states, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (Slovakia), effective at midnight on December 31, 1992, barely three years after the Velvet Revolution.

a) *Slovak Exceptionalism*

As Miroslav Kusý, analyst of Czech and Slovak affairs, argues, the “Slovak question,” or “Slovak exceptionalism,” was much discussed among foreign and domestic analysts a long time before Czechoslovakia’s separation. He wrote:

⁵⁵ “Red Army Occupation Ends After 23 Years.” 25 June 1991. *Agence France Presse*, 25 June 1991. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 2.

⁵⁶ “Slovensko a Demokratizácia (Slovakia and Democratization).” 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.iips.com/slovensko/hidemokr.htm>> [31 August 1998], p. 1.

Slovakia was too different, it was claimed: it was oriented in quite a different direction from the Czech Lands; Slovaks were too different from Czechs, and so their joint state was only an artificially and forcibly maintained entity, incapable of an independent and democratic life.... There existed several stereotyped view of the position of Slovakia.... Some of these stereotypes described reality truthfully, but only superficially, while others distorted or simply contradicted reality.... Such standard characteristics of the Slovaks with Czechs can be identified:

- 1) Slovaks are more nationalistically oriented;
- 2) Slovaks are more separatistically oriented;
- 3) Slovaks are more Christian-oriented;
- 4) Slovaks are more left-wing; and
- 5) Slovaks are more eastwardly oriented.⁵⁷

Although Slovakia has changed, we can still observe some of these characteristics (more fully discussed in the third chapter of this thesis) in the country's domestic politics represented by the minorities in the Slovakian leadership.

As many experts argue, in spite of social, cultural, historical, and economic differences, the main reasons for the separation were the conflicting opinions of the Czechs and Slovaks on the rapid market reforms promoted by Václav Klaus and the nationalistic demands of Vladimír Mečiar for Slovak autonomy. As Carol Skalnik Leff wrote:

⁵⁷ Miroslav Kusý, "Slovak Exceptionalism," in Jiří Musil, *The End of Czechoslovakia*, ed., (New York: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 139-140.

The disintegration of the state in 1992 was the culmination of a long history of failed Czech and Slovak efforts to devise a mutually satisfactory arrangement for coexistence in a common state... the lack of a vigorous independence sentiment on either side... the federal structure and its minority veto provision, the segmented Czech and Slovak party systems, the historically conditioned atmosphere of mutual distrust, and the differential impact of economic reform all combined to undercut the chances of a settlement.

Competitive elections put the national question firmly on the agenda, and the functioning of a genuinely representative Federal Assembly prevented any move to smother that question.⁵⁸

There were certainly some doubts about the intention behind the breakup of Czechoslovakia among Czech and Slovak citizens. As Table II-1 below indicates, in contrast to the Slovaks, from November 1991 to July 1992, the Czechs were more for a “unitary state” or “federations” and less for an “independent state.”

However, the Parliamentary decision not to have a referendum on the disintegration of the state at the end of 1992 relinquished the legislative power to the Czech Prime Minister and Chairman of the ODS, Václav Klaus, and the Slovak nationalist leader and Chairman of the HZDS, Vladimír Mečiar, and so they agreed on the division of Czechoslovakia.

⁵⁸ Carol Skalnik Leff, “National Identity and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia,” *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 143-144.

Table II-1 Public Opinion on the State Structure and the Preferred Form of Czech-Slovak Relationship in Czechoslovakia in 1992

(figures in percent; CR – Czech Republic, SR – Slovak Republic)

Type of state Arrangement	Nov 1991		Dec 1991		Jan 1992		Mar 1992		May 1992		June 1992		July 1992	
	CR	SR	CR	SR	CR	SR								
Unitary state	39	20	36	17	38	17	34	13	34	12	29	11	38	14
Federation	30	26	27	31	32	33	27	24	28	33	28	26	19	27
Lands-based Republic	20	6	24	4	15	5	18	9	22	6	21	6	18	8
Confederation	4	27	4	30	4	30	6	32	6	31	5	31	3	30
Independent state	5	14	6	11	5	12	11	17	6	11	13	18	16	16
Don't know	2	7	3	7	6	3	4	5	4	7	4	8	6	5

Sources: Sharon L. Wolchik, "Table 12. 3 Preferred State Arrangement, 1991 and 1992 (in %)," in Jiří Musil, *The End of Czechoslovakia*, ed., (New York: Central European University Press, 1995), p. 234.

Yet even though there was no political movement to stop the separation, or to call for unification, after a short negotiation between the two sides and after several attempts, the Federal Parliament succeeded in creating a constitutional law about the division of the Czech and Slovak nations. Therefore, the separation, sometimes called the "Velvet Divorce," of January 1, 1993, was not only peaceful and democratic, but also completely legal. Since that time, the two new republics have appeared on the world map and stepped forward to continue the process of state-building based on democratic principles, each in its own way.

III. STATE TRANSITION – RETURN TO DEMOCRACY

Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.⁵⁹ -- Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karl

A. INTRODUCTION

While the 1948 Communist coup brought an end to democracy in the thirty-year-old democratic Czechoslovakia, the November 1989 events returned democracy to the Czech and the Slovak Socialist Republic (CSSR). After almost forty-one years, the newly-established government began to listen to its citizens. The new President of Czechoslovakia, Václav Havel, said in his New Year's Address to the nation on January 1, 1990: "People, your government has returned to you!"⁶⁰ Thus, the democratic traditions of Czechs and Slovaks returned to Czechoslovakia. In 1989, after overthrowing the one-party government, Czechoslovakian citizens found new freedom—the right to form political parties and movements according to their political convictions. Hence, very soon after the fall of the totalitarian regime, a colorful variety of political parties was established and provided the foundations for a more stable political climate in

⁵⁹ Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is...And Is Not," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, eds., Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 40.

⁶⁰ Václav Havel, "New Year's Address to the Nation," 1 January 1990. Available [Online]: http://scol.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index_uk.html [9 October 1998], p. 1.

which the people could benefit from a fully Parliamentary democracy, including free speech, free elections, and a vigorously free media.

This chapter explores Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's analysis of this democratic transition, a transition engendered by the collapse of "frozen" post-totalitarianism.⁶¹ The first part of this chapter further analyzes the November 1989 events in Czechoslovakia when the country's transition to a consolidated democracy emerged after the Communist Party thoroughly collapsed.

As Linz and Stepan argue, the basic condition for democracy to be consolidated is that "democracy is a form of governance of state. Thus, no modern polity can become democratically consolidated unless it is first a state."⁶² In this chapter, I argue that post-WW II Czechoslovakia was not a unified state as it had been from 1918 to 1938; therefore, a consolidated democracy in the country was impossible unless Czechoslovakia was divided. The second and third parts of this chapter will compare the Czech Republic and Slovakia and their basic political systems, government policies, political societies, economies, and civil-military relations.

This chapter concludes by comparing the consequences of the successful Czech transition to democracy and the Slovak democratization failure caused mostly by

⁶¹ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Modern Nondemocratic Regimes," *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 42.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Slovakia's leadership, which has negatively impacted Slovakia's international relations and the Euro-Atlantic integration.

B. DEMOCRATIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Having explained the historical background of Czechoslovakia in the second chapter, I must now stress once again that Czechoslovakia, in contrast to the other Central European's countries, was the only state that:

- had one of the strongest traditions of law and the most developed industry in Central Europe during the Habsburg Empire;
- had a functioning democracy based on American principles from 1918 until 1938 (the time of Czechoslovakia's partition and occupation by Nazi Germany in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement); and
- had the most developed civil society with the most fully literate population in Central Europe.⁶³

In contrast to the transitions of the other two NATO invitees, Poland, and Hungary, these above three factors also led to the rapid return of democracy to Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia could not have, as Linz and Stepan state, "pacted" a transition path (as Poland did) or "negotiated" a transition path (as Hungary did) to democracy. In Poland, "the pacted transitions meant that [their] democracy started with the old regime's constitution and with the old regime still retaining a strong position in the legislature and in the state apparatus."⁶⁴ This was the case of the Solidarity

⁶³ Ibid., p. 316.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 265

Movement in Poland from August 1989 until December 1991. In Hungary, the negotiated transition path meant that the opposition was made up of several parties and social movements that created an organization called the “Opposition Round Table,” which negotiated an agreement to have free elections in which they received the most votes and thereby created a majority coalition government in 1990.⁶⁵ In Czechoslovakia in 1989, after ten days of general public demonstrations, the Communist regime tumbled because of a disoriented and paralyzed leadership. Since the Czech Communist leadership could not count on USSR supremacy in Czechoslovakia as it had existed in 1968, suddenly they had little recourse. Thus, at the time of the “Velvet Revolution” there was no danger of Soviet intervention.

As Linz and Stepan argue, Czechoslovakia did not meet any of the above-mentioned transition factors to democracy. The democratization process in Czechoslovakia was characterized as a transition initiated by the destruction of the frozen post-totalitarian regime “in which *collapse*, rather than negotiation, [was] a more likely transition path and ... the opposition, surprised by its unexpected success, normally [had] not developed an articulated political approach.”⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 307.

⁶⁶ “Frozen post-totalitarian regime” is a regime in which, “despite the persistent tolerance of some civil society critics of the regime, almost all the other control mechanisms of the party-state stay in place for a long period and do not evolve (e.g., Czechoslovakia from 1977 to 1989).” See Ibid., pp. 42 and 321.

On November 17, 1989, the leaders of the Communist regime were totally unprepared to deal with the mass public demonstration in Czechoslovakia that followed ten days after the state police brutally beat students in the center of Prague. At this point, more and more Czechs and Slovaks supported general strikes and called for essential political and economic changes and the resignation of Communist leaders by chanting such slogans, as "It is already here" or "Jakeš in the trash." Subsequently, the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee held an extraordinary session in which the Presidium of the Communist Party resigned and the lesser-known Communist, Karel Urbánek was elected as the new head of the Communist Party, replacing the Secretary General of the Communist Party, Miloš Jakeš.⁶⁷

Fortunately, the armed forces in the country, the people's militia, and the state police clearly stated that they would not fight against their own people or solve the persistent political and economic crisis by force. After the resignation of the Communist Central Committee and the abolition of media censorship, the Civic Forum presented a list of political demands. The Civic Forum, still led by its spokesman, Václav Havel, met with Prime Minister Ladislav Adamec, who agreed to form a new coalition government. The new coalition government was named by President Husák, who had held the presidential office since 1975, and who during his last years was seen by Czechoslovak citizens as a figurehead without power. President Husák, supporting a constitutional

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 327.

dominance of Communist power in the country, resigned from the office immediately after the nomination of this new government, on December 10, 1989.

To know why the Communist Party was toppled, we should recall Václav Havel's famous 1975 "Letter to Dr. Gustav Husák," in which he stated: "In trying to paralyze life, the authorities paralyze themselves and, in the long run, incapacitate themselves for paralyzing life."⁶⁸

After President Husák resigned, the Federal Assembly under Chairman Alexandr Dubček, who had led the 1968 Prague Spring movement, elected the Civic Forum's leader Václav Havel as President of Czechoslovakia on December 29, 1989. Completing the first phase of Czechoslovakia's transition to a Western-style democracy, the Federal Assembly re-elected Václav Havel as President on July 5, 1990. Members of both the Federal Assembly and President Havel were elected for an initial two-year term. Their main goals were to steer the country away from Communist rule. This included implementing a free-market economy and adopting a new constitution.

1. State Democratization Process: A Chance for Slovakian Autonomy Followed by the Division of Czechoslovakia

Following both the Communist demise in Czechoslovakia in 1989 and the first phase of Czechoslovakia's transition, the most important task for the new leadership was securing its hard-won democracy both nationally and internationally. Soon, the new government and Parliament were able to change the legal framework, particularly the

⁶⁸ Ibid.

gaps in Czechoslovakian human rights and free elections. They also strengthened freedom of the press and media, private ownership of property, and economic laws. Czechoslovakia was praised early and often for its peaceful transition from the Communist regime to a democratic one, yet differences between the country's two major ethnic groups, the Czechs and the Slovaks, became evident almost immediately and were quickly exploited by both sides. Besides the historical and economic differences between the Czechs and Slovaks, there was only four percent Slovaks in the Czech lands and only one percent Czechs in Slovakia.⁶⁹ There was also a special feeling among the Czech and Slovak people that instead of a unified common state with two major ethnic groups there were two separated states ruled by one Communist government that acted in favor of the Czech population. For example, all political centers were located in Prague and all political decisions were made in Prague as well. Naturally, many Slovaks did not like this allocation of power that led to the centralization of power in the Czech lands and felt disenfranchised. As Carol Skalnik Leff has written:

⁶⁹ Carol Skalnik Leff, "National Identity and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia," *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 141.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the national tensions in Czech-Slovak disputes over the constitutional allocation of power is that these conflicts call into question the Western idea of democracy, which has been based on a theoretical foundation of individual rights and majority rule. The Slovak challenge was to the idea of majority rule. Slovak leaders assumed as a basic article of democratic faith that a system in which the Czech majority could determine policy for Slovakia was no democracy.... The quarrel about federation was really a quarrel about what democracy should look like in a multinational state.⁷⁰

These factors led to different Czechs and Slovaks opinions on the democratization process and significantly contributed to the division. Hungarians, as I mentioned earlier, ruled the Slovaks for a hundred years, and in the Czechoslovak state, the Slovaks now felt that the Czechs ruled them. Thus, if “democracy is a form of governance of a state,” as Linz and Stepan have remarked, and a consolidated modern democracy cannot exist without the existence of the state,⁷¹ I argue that the “Czech-Slovak conflict” over state structure led these two nations along the different routes to democracy.

In the early 1990s there were only three countries in the Central and Eastern Europe region--the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia--that dissolved either because of the transition from one regime to another, as in the case of the Soviet Union, or because of an ethnic conflict, as in the case of the former Yugoslavia. In the case of Czechoslovakia the separation resulted, aside from the above-mentioned historical and economic differences, for two primary reasons: 1) the Czechs supported the transition

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 144.

⁷¹ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Democracy and Its Arenas,” *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 7.

from the post-Communist regime to the democratic one with rapid economic reforms and a privatization process; and 2) Slovaks leaders advocated nationalistic issues and called for more autonomy and a slowing of both the privatization process and economic reforms.

Václav Benda, Catholic dissident and former leader of the Czech Christian Democrats, comparing election results in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic, stated in one of the main Czech newspapers *Lidové Noviny*, on September 1, 1992:

In the Czech Republic, the democratic forces won a victory over the non-democratic crypto-Communist left.... But in the Slovak Republic, 85 percent of mandates were won by nationalistically or even separatistically oriented, predominantly left-wing, and strongly anti-reformist parties.

The election results confronted us basically with the decision of whether we want another relapse of socialism in a common state or a democratic development in an independent Czech Republic.⁷²

The results of the first local and Parliamentary free elections in Czechoslovakia in 1990, where the citizen forces, Civic Forum (OF) and the Public Against Violence (VPN), received majority votes, overwhelmingly answered the question of whether to have communism or not. Furthermore, the second nationwide Federal Assembly (Parliamentary) free elections in Czechoslovakia, completed on June 6, 1992, (Table III-1) help us to understand the different democratization courses that Czechs and Slovaks took toward democracy.

⁷² Ladislav Holý, "Self-Stereotypes and National Traditions," *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 113.

Table III-1 Second and Last Free Parliamentary Election of Czechoslovakia in 1992

(Figures in percents; number of seats in parentheses)

CZECH REPUBLIC Major Political Parties	House of Representatives	House of Nations	Czech National Council
ODS (Civic Democratic Party)	33.90 (20)	33.43 (19)	29.73 (17)
CSSD (Social Democratic Party)	7.67 (9)	6.8 (11)	6.53 (9)
LB (Left Block-Communists)	14.27 (12)	14.48 (13)	14.05 (11)
LSU (Liberal-Social Union)	5.84 (7)	6.06 (5)	6.52 (8)
ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance)	4.98 (6)	4.08 (5)	5.93 (6)
SPR-RSC (Republican Party)	6.48 (4)	6.37 (4)	5.98 (4)
SMS (Moravian National Party)	4.23 (4)	4.90 (5)	5.87 (6)
KDU (Christian Democratic Union)	5.98 (6)	6.08 (6)	6.28 (8)
SLOVAK REPUBLIC Major Political Parties	House of Representatives	House of Nations	Slovak National Council
HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia)	33.53 (27)	33.85 (28)	37.26 (28)
SDL (Left-wing Democratic Party)	14.44 (13)	14.04 (11)	14.70 (13)
KDH (Christian Democratic Movement)	8.96 (9)	8.81 (8)	8.88 (9)
SDS (Social Democrats)	4.86 (6)	6.09 (5)	4.0 (5)
SNS (Slovak National Party)	9.39 (9)	9.35 (12)	7.93 (12)
M-E-M (Coalition of Hungarian parties)	7.37 (4)	7.39 (5)	7.42 (4)

Source: "Election Has Finished - What Else?" *Carolina*, No 30.1. Available [Online]: <gopher://cucc.ruk.cuni.cz:70/00/carolina/car-eng/archiv/Carolina-E%20No%20030A> [22 September 1998], pp. 1-2.

At stake in the two days of voting were 300 seats in the new bicameral Federal Assembly (the House of Representatives and House of Nations) as well as 200 seats in the Czech National Council and 150 seats in the Slovak National Council.

As these above tables show, by deciding whether to continue with economic reform or whether to stay in a common federal state of Czechs and Slovaks, voters definitely showed in the 1992 Czechoslovak elections the differences between the Czechs' and Slovaks' views on the democratization process. After the 1992 elections, the situation in Czechoslovakia was very complicated. Regarding the issue of a unified, single federated state, these tables also show the vast differences between the Czech and Slovak voters. In Czech lands, the majority of voters aligned themselves with the right-wing Civil Democratic Party (ODS) and supported a federal country, composed of both the Czech lands and Slovakia.

However, in Slovakia the election and results were completely the opposite. The Slovaks Christian Democratic Movement (KDH)—the only right-wing party in Slovakia—the ultranationalist Slovak National Party, and the majority of Slovaks strongly supported Mečiar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS): “all claimed,” as Leff noted, “to have the ‘best’ program for defending Slovak interests.”⁷³ Their political platform was based on an independent Slovakia completely divorced politically and economically from the Czech nation. As a result, Czechoslovakia's

⁷³ Carol Skalnik Leff, “The Velvet Revolution of 1989 and the Politics of Democratization,” *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 90.

President Havel resigned in July 1992, and left the divorce negotiations to Prime Ministers Klaus and Mečiar. This, as it was argued earlier, proved that a shared future for the two nations was essentially impossible anymore.

As a result of these differences, since January 1, 1993, these two republics, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, have begun building their new political systems, economies, and militaries, and they differ greatly from each other.

As we can see, the complexities of forming a democracy in nations such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia are immense. A myriad of conditions must be met before a democratic system can be set in place. Linz and Stepan concluded that “stateness” problems, particularly the complex relationship between states, nations, and the democratization process, are so basic that “five other interconnected and mutually reinforced conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy to be consolidated.”⁷⁴

These elements are

- 1) The conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society;
- 2) There must be a relatively autonomous and valued political society;
- 3) There must be a rule of law to ensure legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life;
- 4) There must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government; and
- 5) There must be an institutionalized economic society.⁷⁵

⁷⁴ Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, “Democracy and Its Arenas,” *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 7.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Thus, as Linz and Stepan concluded:

A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when this government *de facto* has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies *de jure*.⁷⁶

In Czechoslovakia after July 1992, an agreement on political procedures between the ODS and HZDS on the forming of a stable federal government was impossible, especially when Mečiar did not want to give up his nationalistic demands for Slovak autonomy.

Like Linz and Stepan, Adam Przeworski, in his essay, "The Games of Transition," also argues that "if democracy is to be consolidated, four problems must be resolved along the way:

- 1) An institutional framework for contestation ... must be constructed;
- 2) A competitive representative regime must be established;
- 3) Economic conflict must be channeled into the democratic institutions; and
- 4) The military must be tucked [maintained] under civilian control."⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

⁷⁷ Adam Przeworski, "The Games of Transition," in Scott Mainwaring, ed., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), p. 106.

The fourth point of Przeworski's view on consolidated democracy will also help us understand Slovakia's unstable democracy. A transition to democracy is incomplete if an *effective* civilian control of the military is not established.⁷⁸ At the end of this chapter, I will demonstrate that effective civilian control of the military is a basic condition for a fully-functioning democracy.

Jeffrey Simon, a Central European senior analyst at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, in his book *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*, catalogued the following four conditions “as being necessary to determine whether a state is exerting ‘effective’ democratic ... management of the military.”⁷⁹ These conditions are:

- 1) A clear division of authority between president and the government (prime minister and defense/interior minister) in Constitutions or through public law;
- 2) Parliamentary oversight [control] of the military through control of the defense budget;
- 3) Peacetime government oversight [control] of General Staff and military commanders through civilian defense ministries;
- 4) Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the armed forces to be effective.⁸⁰

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 105.

⁷⁹ Jeffrey Simon, “NATO Enlargement: Blazing the Trail,” *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), p. 26.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

As I will later show in my section on the civilian control of the military in both states, Slovakia in contrast to the Czech Republic did not meet two of Simon's conditions, the first and third one.

During the last nine years, these issues of civil-military relations in creating new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe were major topics of discussion. Such issues included a) depoliticizing an army in which almost every officer was a member of the Communist Party; b) establishing a new position of civilian Minister of Defense; and c) developing a new strategic orientation for the country after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact to create new national and military defense strategies.

To reveal some other democratization differences that led the Czech Republic toward democracy and directed Slovakia, because of its problems of statecraft, to a rather persistingly unstable democracy, I will focus on some of the conditions and problems of a consolidated democracy. This will include the government policies, elections, political societies, and economies in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, separately.

C. STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AFTER 1993

The Czech Republic, a country in the heart of Europe, situated in Central Europe, occupies the historical regions of Bohemia, Moravia, and a part of Silesia, with an area of 78,864 square kilometers and a population of 10.4 million. As the map (Figure III-1) shows below, the Czech Republic is bound on the north by Poland, on the east by Slovakia, on the south by Austria, and on its long western border by Germany.

Since the division of Czechoslovakia in 1993, the Czech Republic has demonstrated its commitment to the principles defined by a modern community: the rule of law, a respect for human rights, free and fair elections, the establishment of multi-party systems, and the introduction of a free-market economy.




Figure III-1 A Map of the Czech Republic in 1998

Source: "Map of the Czech Republic." 10 July 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.eubusiness.com/czech/map.gif> [28 October 1998].

As some Western observers have stated, despite some persisting limitations in economic reforms, the Czech Republic, with its strong public support for reform, and its integration into Western supranational structures belongs among the most politically and economically stable post-Communist states.

1. Political System and Foreign Policy

Today the Czech Republic is a fully-functioning Parliamentary democracy. The Czech National Council in its Constitutional Act passed the present Czech Republic constitution on December 16, 1992.

The President of the Czech Republic is the head of the country and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. He is elected by a joint session of both Chambers of the Parliament for the term of five years. Presidential power is limited; however, the most important power is the right to veto any bill which has already been passed by Parliament, with the exception of constitutional bills. This power is void in times of constitutional or other political crises. The President may serve a maximum of two successive terms in office. The President of the Czech Republic is Václav Havel, who after his transitional two-year term (1990-1992) and the first five-year term (1992-1997), was re-elected in 1997.

The government is the supreme body of executive power. It consists of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, and Ministers, and coordinates activities of the ministries and the central body of the state administration and manages the state administration throughout the territory of the state. The government has exclusive legislative initiative in terms of the state budget.

The Parliament, which is the Czech Republic's supreme legislative body, consists of two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. It passes all bills valid in the territory of the Czech Republic and expresses approval of important international treaties, such as human rights and basic liberties, political treaties, and general economic treaties. It decides the most important acts of state, such as declaring war or approving the deployment of the Czech Army abroad and foreign armies on the Czech territory.

In September 1995, after several discussions, the Czech Parliament passed a bill that created the Czech Senate—an important constitutional legislative body that was

lacking. Previously, in the event of a government collapse, the lower chamber of the Parliament would have needed to be dissolved after the new Parliamentary elections, and the absence of the Senate could have caused a constitutional crisis. This Senate is now made up of eighty-one senators elected for six-year terms. Every two years one-third of the Senate's seats come up for re-election. According to the Czech Republic's constitution, the Senate cannot be dissolved. The Chamber of Deputies is made up of 200 deputies elected for a term of four years (the last election took place in June 1998). The President can dissolve the Chamber of Deputies in certain cases outlined in the constitution.

Elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate take place by secret ballot on the basis of general, equal, and direct voting. The Chamber of Deputies is elected on the basis of proportional representation. Political parties must obtain five percent of the popular vote in order to gain seats in the chamber. The Senate is elected on the basis of a majority vote.⁸¹

a) Government Foreign Policy Priority

Since the restoration of freedom in 1989 and the independence of the Czech Republic on January 1, 1993, the top priority of the Czech government's foreign policy has been joining NATO, the European Union and the Western European Union. Since 1993, each government has supported the strong Czech position on NATO and EU

⁸¹ "Constitution of the Czech Republic," 16 December 1992. Available [Online]: <<http://fenrir.psp.cz/cgi-bin/eng/docs/laws/constitution.html>> [28 October 1998].

integration. The strong point of view of the Czech Republic on NATO membership can also be seen by the government's decision not to have a national referendum on the Czech Republic's entrance into NATO which was supported by the second largest party, CSSD, prior to the June 1998 Parliamentary elections.⁸² However, a clear message was sent abroad after the Czech government, the Czech Parliament, and finally the Czech Senate overwhelmingly voted for NATO membership on April 30, 1998.⁸³

b) Elections and Political Society

Since its independence in 1993, the Czech Republic "has experienced considerably greater political stability" and developed a civil society superior to that of Slovakia.⁸⁴ The Czech government, with its Prime Minister Klaus, has continued with market reforms and the privatization process promoted in the 1992 Czechoslovakian elections, and all changes in political and social life have been subordinated to these economic issues. During 1995 and 1996, several public corruption scandals relating to the privatization process and secret financing of political parties emerged as a result of gaps in the new economic laws. These events and little government interest in the

⁸² Michal Mocek, "Pro CSSD končí dlouhý pochod do náruče Alliance (A Long March to NATO's Arms for the CSSD Ends)," *Dnes* (8 October 1998), p. 10.

⁸³ "Český Senát také hlasoval pro NATO (The Czech Senate Voted for NATO Too)," *Lidové Noviny* (2 May 1998), p. 1.

⁸⁴ Carol Skalnik Leff, "Political and National Identity in the Czech and Slovak Republics," *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 157.

military reforms caused voters to be skeptical of the government coalition, and the ODS, the strongest party in the country.

In the 1996 Czech Republic's first independent Parliamentary elections, only six of twenty registered parties and movements obtained five percent or more of the popular vote (Table III-2). The three strongest government coalition parties (ODS, KDU-CSL, ODA) obtained ninety-nine mandates in the Chamber of Deputies and fifty-two mandates in the Senate. This means that the former coalition narrowly lost its Parliamentary majority. The government was center-and right-oriented and tried to finish the transformation process of the Czech Republic. Vaclav Klaus, chairman of the ODS, was reelected as Prime minister.

Table III-2 Elections to the Czech Parliament, May 31 – June 1, 1996

Czech Parliament (200 seats) Major Political Parties	percent of Votes	number of Seats
ODS (Civic Democratic Party)	29.6	68
CSSD (Social Democratic Party)	26.5	61
KSČM (Communists)	10.3	22
KDU (Christian Democratic Union)	8.1	18
ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance)	6.4	13
SPR-RSC (Republican Party)	8.0	18

Source: "Czech Election Results." *Facts on File World News Digest*, 6 August 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [9 November 1998], p. 1. And "Ruling Coalition Loses Majority." *Facts on File World News Digest*, 6 June 1996. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 November 1998], p. 1.

In December 1997, the government was forced to resign when the coalition disintegrated. This was caused mainly by the long-term disagreements within the coalition parties, several financial scandals, and the worsening economic performance of the Czech Republic.

In January 1998, the new temporary government of Prime Minister Jozef Tošovský, former head of the Czech National Bank, whose primary task was to prepare the country for the early Parliamentary elections in June 1998, was appointed by President Havel. In the June 1998 Parliamentary elections, the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD) gained the majority of votes (32.3 percent) which gave it seventy-four of the 200 seats in Parliament. Table III-3 breaks down the percentage of votes received by each party and the number of seats it secured:

Table III-3 Elections to the Czech Parliament, June 20 – 21, 1998

Czech Parliament (200 seats) Major Political Parties	percent of Votes	number of Seats
CSSD (Social Democratic Party)	32.3	74
ODS (Civic Democratic Party)	27.7	63
KSČM (Communists)	11.3	24
KDU (Christian Democratic Union)	9.0	20
US (Freedom Union)	8.6	19
SPR-RSC (Republican Party)	3.9	0
DŽJ (Pensioners for a Secure Life)	3.06	0

Source: "Czech Election Results." *Facts on File World News Digest*, 6 August 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [9 November 1998], p. 1.

Although Miloš Zeman, the chairman of CSSD, won the elections, he had a more difficult situation than his predecessor, former Prime Minister Václav Klaus. However, Zeman claimed the right to form the left-right government immediately after the election and surprised many political experts who would not have predicted that the left-wing party, CSSD, could ever agree with the right-wing party, OSD, before the election. Zeman said, “This is a normal procedure in any democratic country, and we want to be a democratic country.”⁸⁵ After a few weeks of negotiations and despite some difficulties among all the parties to create a government coalition, Social Democrat leader Zeman finally formed a minority government, called “a shadow government,” following a procedural opposition agreement with the conservative ODS (27.74 percent) which had sixty-three seats in the Parliament. For the first time since 1989, a left-oriented opposition Social Democratic party “won the Czech Republic’s Parliamentary election—their first win for 78 years,”⁸⁶ and ruled in the Czech Republic. Klaus and Zeman exchanged their chairs when Zeman became new Prime Minister and Václav Klaus became Chairman of the Parliament.

The left-right cabinet with its Social Democrat Prime Minister Zeman accepted the market economy reforms and commitment to NATO and EU membership but also promised to increase spending on social security, and to crack down on

⁸⁵ “A Turn to the Left as Social Democrats Win Czech Election.” *Deustche Presse-Agentur*, 20 June 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [20 June 1998], p. 1.

⁸⁶ “Special Election Reports ‘98,” 21 June 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://voskovec.radio.cz/elections98/election.html>> [30 July 1998], p. 1.

corruption and so-called “*money laundering and tunneling*,” which had lately contributed to the worsening Czech economic performance before NATO and EU membership.

c) A Brief Economic Status and Goals

The Czech Republic, with its strategic central European geographic locations and long borders with Germany and Austria, belongs among the most advanced of the former Communist-bloc nations and the most attractive investment countries in Central and Eastern Europe because of its minimal national debt, stable Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, and the lowest levels of inflation and unemployment in Central and Eastern Europe. After the division of the republic, the Czech economy started to grow in 1994. In 1995 and 1996, the real GDP growth was between five and six percent and the average inflation rate was between eight and nine percent. Signaling the country’s return to one of the world’s most advanced economies, the Czech Republic joined the Organization of Eastern and Central Development (OECD) on November 28, 1995, and was the first post-Communist country to receive an “A” rating from the Moody’s Investors’ Service and Standard & Poor’s.⁸⁷ Since 1996, after a rapid (both small- and large-scale) Czech privatization, the Czech Republic set up a privatization bank and adopted European economic laws. In 1997, according to the World Trade

⁸⁷ “What Is the Investment Climate in the Czech Republic? - CzechInvest.” *Mondaq Business Briefing*, 23 July 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 November 1998], p. 1.

Organization (WTO), the Czech Republic was the twenty-eighth biggest exporter (\$22.5 billion) and importer (\$27 billion) in the world.⁸⁸

The top economic priority goal of the country is the EU membership. By a decision of the European Commission in June 1998, the Czech Republic and five other countries, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus were invited to begin accession talks. The first concrete EU membership negotiations began on November 10, 1998.⁸⁹

d) The Basis of Democratic Contemporary Civil-Military Relations

The Czech Republic's possible integration into the military alliance of NATO, the primary foreign policy goal, after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 significantly contributed to the expansion of a modern military, as well as an increase in military prestige and civil-military relations.⁹⁰

"The attitudes towards joining NATO reflected general political and ideological polarization in the country," but debate about the NATO membership

⁸⁸ "ČR ve vývozu i dovozu osmadvacátá ve světě (The Czech Republic in Exports and Imports Is 28th in the World)," *Rudé Právo*, 2 November 1998, p. 19.

⁸⁹ "Praha konečně vstoupila na práh Evropské Unie (Prague Finally Stepped on the Threshold of the European Union)," *Mladá Fronta Dnes*, 11 November 1998, p. 1.

⁹⁰ In Czechoslovakia in the beginning of 1990, the military's low prestige had important consequences for Czechoslovak civil-military relations and national security thinking. See Thomas S. Szayna and James B. Steinberg, "The Prestige Problem," *Civil-Military Relations and National Security Thinking in Czechoslovakia: A Conference Report*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992), pp. 7-11.

improved and increased the interest of policymakers on the military issues. Also military prestige with debate on NATO enlargement has improved.⁹¹

In contrast to Hungary, public support for NATO membership in the Czech Republic was quite low in 1993 and in the beginning of 1994. President Clinton's February 1994 visit to Prague, where he for the first time publicly spoke about a new PfP (Partnership for Peace) program, increased public support for the Czech Republic to enter NATO. In 1998, the Czech Republic's closer association with the West has positively influenced the Czech's attitudes toward the military and continuing defense reforms. This also increased public support for NATO. While, according to the Institute for Research of Public Opinion Polls (IVVM), only forty-five to forty-seven percent of Czechs supported the country's entry in April and June of 1997, by November 1998, it had risen to fifty-seven percent--the national record since 1991.⁹²

The constitution of the Czech Republic, which became valid on the day of the birth of the new state, explicitly defined civil rights, the relationship between the executive and legislative branches of power, the independence of the judiciary, and further created basic conditions for effective civilian control of the military.

⁹¹ Marie Vlachová and Štefan Sarvaš, "From the Totalitarian to the Post-Totalitarian Military," in Anton A. Bebler, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 99.

⁹² "Cabinet to Blame for Low Public Support for NATO – Žantovský." *CTK National News Wire*, 23 June 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1. And "Podpora rozšíření NATO vzrůstá (Support for NATO Enlargement Grows Up)," *Lidové Noviny*, 10 November 1998, p. 1.

According to excerpts from the declaration of governmental policy, "The government is aware of the fact that the base of defense is its trustworthiness and, above all, a clearly defined willingness to defend the country. The defense of the country is not merely an issue concerning its armed forces but also the whole society and each individual citizen.... The government is prepared to pay utmost attention to the completion of the transformation process of our army and the modernization of its technology, to achieve compatibility between the Army of the Czech Republic and NATO armed forces."⁹³

Even though the civilian and military chain of command has gone through several broad reorganization and personnel changes since 1993, as Table III-4 shows below, the process of transformation is not completed yet; and the further, no less complicated phase of entering NATO and building a modern army for the Czech Republic, including "maximum communication between the army and society regarding defense issues, completion of the transformation process, acquisition of important weapons, and preparation of the army for NATO membership," still lies ahead.⁹⁴

93 "Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic." (Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, AVIS, Naše Vojsko, 1997), p. 1.

94 Simon, Jeffrey, "The Czech Republic: Advancing toward Democracy," *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), pp. 237-238.

Table III-4 THE RULERS OF THE DEFENSE REFORMS AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS FROM 1993 TO 1998

President of the Czech Republic

Václav Havel	1/1993 – present
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Prime Ministers

Václav Klaus	1/1993 – 11/1997
Josef Tošovský	12/1997 – 7/1998
Milos Zeman	7/1998 – present

Ministers of Defense

Antonín Baudyš	1/1993 – 9/1994
Vilém Holáň	9/1994 – 7/1996
Miloslav Výborný	7/1996 – 1/1998
Michal Lobkowicz	1/1998 – 7/1998
Vladimír Vetchý	7/1998 – present

Chiefs of Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic

General Colonel Jiří Nekvasil	7/1993 – 5/1998
Lt. General Jiří Šedivý	5/1998 – present

According to this table, since 1993, during a five-year period, there have been five Ministries of Defense. Taking over the office, each of them selected his own staff and it took a while to familiarize this staff with the current military issues. Except for expressing the same opinion on NATO enlargement, every minister had his own concept for reorganizing the military. Unfortunately, by the time each minister started to implement some of his military reorganization plans, it was time to leave the office.

However, after the Parliamentary election in June 1998, Vladimír Vetchý, former head of the Social Democrat (CSSD) defense commission, who became a new Defense Minister in the government of CSSD leader Miloš Zeman, stated that:

The Czech Republic [is] lacking the necessary legislation to build its defense, and therefore it must pass laws on civic defense, the army, army administration offices, career soldiers, military and alternative services, army exercises, reservist soldiers, and on foreign armed forces on the territory of the Czech Republic and Czech armed forces abroad. The existing legislation comes from the 1960s and even from the 1940s.⁹⁵

Vladimír Vetchý seems to be the only Minister of Defense whose priority goal is the personnel and social issue of the military, one of the most required tasks for the Czech Republic's integration to NATO. After his first visit to Washington in September 1998, where he met William Cohen, the US Secretary of Defense, and his assistant Franklin Kramer, Vetchý said that American representatives of the Pentagon, during their discussion with the Czech delegation on the current situation in the Czech military, were mostly interested in working and social conditions for soldiers.⁹⁶ To implement successfully better working and social conditions for Czech soldiers would mean to cut the number of military personnel.

In response to using the military's financial resources efficiently, Vetchý "did not expect the planned professionalization of the army to cut defense costs, but that it would only make it possible to cut the number of soldiers."⁹⁷

⁹⁵ "Defense Minister Supports NATO Membership." 22 July 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.ctknews.com/archiv/vetchydoc.htm>> [28 August 1998], p. 1.

⁹⁶ Jiří Roškot, "Vetchý: Američany nejvíce zajímá pracovní a sociální zázemí vojáků (Vetchý: Americans Are Mostly Interesting in Working and Social Conditions for Soldiers)." 21 September 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/rp/1998/980921/rp050703.html>> [22 September 1998], p. 1.

⁹⁷ "Defense Minister Supports NATO Membership." 22 July 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.ctknews.com/archiv/vetchydoc.htm>> [28 August 1998], p. 1.

(1) The State Budget of the Defense Department. In a democratic society, the state budget of the Ministry of Defense becomes a significant tool in controlling the military. In the Czech Republic, the new US accounting system—the Programming Planing Budgeting System (PPBS), which has been successfully implemented into the defense department—helps this process and enables it to define the real costs of every single military unit.

Although the government passed “the medium term conception which assumes that till 2000 it will increase the rate of military expenditure in GDP by 0.1% annually (Table III-5),”⁹⁸ the proposed modernization programs are very costly, especially modernizing the air force, and cannot be financed from the defense budget.

Table III-5 Czech Military Expenditure Rate from 1995 through 1998

YEAR	EXPENDITURE (in mld CZk)	EXPENDITURE RATE OF MOD (in GDP)
1995	25,070,188	2.23
1996	30,508,821	2.11
1997	30,213,701	1.93
1998	36,877,065	2.11

Source: Source: “Introduction,” *Budget - Facts and Trends '98* (Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, AVIS, Lizard Prague Ltd., 1998), p. 11.

⁹⁸ “Introduction,” *Budget - Facts and Trends '98* (Prague: Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic, AVIS, Lizard Prague Ltd., 1998), pp. 5-7.

This increase means that the military expenditure rate in the Gross Domestic Product in the year 2000 will be approximately 2% (41.4 billion Czechs Crowns, approximately \$1.4 billion).

(2) Limitations on Civil-Military Relations. Among other factors, there have been three serious limitations to further development of the army and civil-military relations such as:

a) Personnel and Social Issues:

Many young lower-ranking officers left the army because they lost their motivation to stay any longer in a military that was unable to provide them with basic benefits, such as housing for their families. Also many civilian companies offered at least double the salary that the military could afford to pay for very well-educated young officers. Further, a disproportion between NCO officers and upper-ranking officers causes no less of a problem in the military service, where the so-called *career pyramid* in the Czech Republic Army is still “upside-down” (far more Lt. Colonels and Colonels than non-commissioned officers [NCOs]). To illustrate, according to the 1997 Ministry of Defense Year-book, as of December 31, 1997, of the 23,759 professional soldiers in the Czech Republic Army, there were 15,341 officers (3,401 Lt. Colonels and 660 Colonels), 7,196 warrant officers and 1,203 NCOs;⁹⁹

⁹⁹ “Personnel Management and Education,” 1997 *Ministry of Defense Year-book* (Prague: Ministry of Defense – AVIS, 1998), p. 58.

b) Acquisition Problems of the Czech Army Modernization Contracts Procedures:

This includes announced public tenders for military equipment and services, which were not transparent (missing public competitions), and in several cases were manipulated by members of the commission; and

c) Insufficient Financial Resources for Costly Strategic Modernization Programs:

For instance, modernizing the air force by purchasing at least two squadrons of modern supersonic aircraft was an enormous burden. The decision to modernize the air force was submitted to the government in 1997, but nothing has been done yet. Such decisions that must be made by the government have been postponed several times because of political changes (i.e. the dissolution of the government coalition in 1997 and the Parliamentary election in 1998).


Despite some of these limitations, before the Czech Republic's entry into NATO, it had been working intensively to meet NATO requirements—the fifty-two Task Force Goals. According to Jeffrey Simon, the Czech Republic "has made enormous progress on the road to achieving democratic control over the military."¹⁰⁰ As Figure III-2 shows below, the Czech Republic with its new Committee for NATO Integration (VIN) and its State Security Council (BRS) already has "effective" civilian control over the military. The BRS consists of two committees, the Committee for Defense Planing

¹⁰⁰ Simon, Jeffrey, "Prologue as Future: What Central Europe Needs to Do," *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), p. 309.

(VPOP) and the Committee for Crisis Management (VPKM). The VPOP is maintained under the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and the VPKM under the Ministry of Interior.¹⁰¹ A successful completion of the accession talks between the Czech Republic and NATO in 1997, and the further qualitative changes in the Armed Forces in the direction of NATO standards has demonstrated the effective civilian control of the military.

¹⁰¹ "Usnesení Vlády České Republiky ze dne 10. června 1998 č. 391 o Bezpečnostní radě státu a o plánovaní opatření k zajištění bezpečnosti České republiky (Decision of the Government of the Czech Republic from June 10, 1998, no. 391, on State Security Council and Planning Measures to Secure the Czech Republic Security)," 10 June 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.vlada.cz/cgi-bin/sqwfASC.cgi/sqw/usnvlad/usntext.sqw?CID=6950>> [10 November 1998], p. 1-2.

Figure III-2 DEFENSE REFORMS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC in 1998



D. THE FATE OF DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA AFTER 1993

With an area of 49,006 square kilometers and a population of 5.45 million, Slovakia, like the Czech Republic, is located in Central Europe (Figure III-3). Poland borders it to the North, Ukraine to the east, Hungary to the south, and Austria and the Czech Republic to the west.



Figure III-3 A Map of the Slovak Republic in 1998

Source: "Map of the Slovak Republic." 6 February 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.eubusiness.com/slovakia/slovakia.jpg> [28 October 1998].

Since the establishment of the Slovak Republic on January 1, 1993, Slovakia has continued the difficult transformation from a rather centrally-controlled political system and economy to a stable democracy and modern market-oriented economy. With its stateness problems and weaknesses in democracy and a market economy, Slovakia has moved out of the first wave among post-Communistic Central and Eastern European states and was excluded from negotiation for accession with NATO and EU. While Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia are being mentioned as "hot" candidates for the next round of NATO enlargement, Slovakia, at the Madrid NATO summit in July 1997 and during the last Slovak Parliamentary September 1998 election, was not even mentioned as a possible candidate for the future NATO enlargement.

1. Slovakia's Political System and Foreign Policy

Slovakia, in contrast to the Czech Republic and other Central European states, is the only state that “really had to build its institutions from scratch because of its long history as part of Czechoslovakia with a government based in Prague.”¹⁰² The Slovak National Council passed the Slovak Constitution on September 1, 1992, by the necessary three-fifths majority.

The President of Slovakia is the head of the state and commander-in-chief. The President is elected to office, and may be recalled, by the Parliament by a three-fifths majority of all its members. In contrast to the Czech Republic, after the Slovakia's 1998 election, based on the coalition agreement, a new government decided to have a direct election of the President.¹⁰³ The same person can be elected President for a maximum of two consecutive five-year electoral terms. The President of Slovakia has limited powers. For example, in case of a crisis, the president does not have the right to dissolve Parliament and call new elections. In Slovakia, dissolving Parliament depends on the will of the deputies and a three-fifths majority of votes in Parliament is needed for this decision.

¹⁰² Jeffrey Simon, “Slovakia: Instability and Special Problems,” *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), p. 253.

¹⁰³ “Prezidenta SR budú voliť občania priamo, spoločným koaličným kandidátom je R. Schuster (Citizens Will Elect President of Slovakia Directly; Common Coalition Candidate is R. Schuster).” 5 November 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/aarticle.asp?dat=447&id=65159>> [6 November 1998], p. 1.

The government of Slovakia is the supreme body for exercising executive power. It consists of the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, and Ministers. The government is formed on the basis of Parliamentary elections. The Prime Minister is appointed and removed by the President of the Slovak Republic. Upon the advice of the Prime Minister, the President appoints and removes other member of the government.

The National Council of the Slovak Republic is a unicameral Parliament, and under the Constitution is the supreme body exercising legislative power in the Slovak Republic. The National Council has 150 members elected for four-year terms in direct elections with secret ballots. Like the Czech Republic, at least five percent of the total vote is needed for a party to enter Parliament. Parties are allocated seats in the Parliament according to the percentage of votes they get in the Parliamentary elections. The Chairman of the National Council of the Slovak Republic is elected or recalled by secret ballot with the consent of an absolute majority of all members of the Parliament.¹⁰⁴

a) Government Foreign Policy Priority

Likewise in the Czech Republic, since the restoration of freedom in 1989 and the independence of the Slovak Republic on January 1, 1993, the integration into the Western European and Transatlantic organizations, such as the EU, NATO and the WEU has been the top foreign policy priority of the Slovak government. Even though these integration efforts are supported by the majority of the Slovak population and political

¹⁰⁴ "The Constitutional of the Slovak Republic." 3 September 1992. Available [Online]: <<http://www.tuzvo.sk/court/c-file.html>> [17 September 1998].

parties, “Slovakia fell from the first tier of candidates for NATO and EU membership after both organizations repeatedly expressed concerns about the quality of the country’s democracy.”¹⁰⁵

b) Slovakia’s Election and Political Society

Since 1994, in the Slovak Republic great political instability has resulted due to Mečiar’s authoritarian activities, bordering on a dictatorship, which Slovaks and political scientists call “Mečiarism.”

In February 1993, Michal Kováč was elected president of the country, and in spite of being a fellow member of the HZDS party, Kováč was not a Mečiar ally. Soon this led to many conflicts within the government. Mečiar’s position was further undermined by the resignation and defection of a number of party deputies in early 1994. In March 1994, Mečiar resigned from office after receiving a vote of “no confidence” from the Slovak Parliament, because he could not get enough support for his privatization policies. An interim coalition government comprising representatives from a broad range of parties was sworn in, with Jozef Moravčík of the Democratic Union of the Slovakia Party as Prime Minister.¹⁰⁶ Moravčík’s government revived the privatization process and took steps to attract more foreign investment to Slovakia. This also helped to calm the increasingly strained relations between Slovaks and resident Hungarians, who had begun

¹⁰⁵ “Slovak Ruling Party Appears Headed to Defeat.” 27 September 1998. Available [Online]: <http://search.washingtonpost.com/w...te/1998-09/27/2681-092798-idx.html> [29 October 1998], p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Carol Skalnik Leff, “National Identity and the Disintegration of Czechoslovakia,” *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1997), pp. 149-150.

campaigning for educational and cultural autonomy. In May 1994, Parliament passed a law that allowed ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia to register their names in their original form. This replaced previous legislation, for which Slovaks were criticized, requiring Hungarians to convert their names to the Slavic form.

When Prime Minister Moravčík assessed his first hundred days in the Slovak government in his speech during a press conference, he stated that “the positive results of the Parliamentary democracy in Slovakia are proof that this system is the best option for Slovakia.” He also thought that the next government to be elected in the fall Parliamentary election “should perpetuate the democratic principles and support cooperation between Slovakia and foreign countries.”¹⁰⁷ However, this hope was far removed from reality.

In the elections held in the fall of 1994, only seven of eighteen registered parties, movements, and coalitions obtained five percent or more of the popular vote.¹⁰⁸ The HZDS Party, led once again by Mečiar, received 34.6 percent of the popular vote and although almost all the parties refused to form a coalition with Mečiar, the HZDS announced its plans to form a government with the support of the ultra-nationalist Slovak National Party.¹⁰⁹ The two parties did not control enough Parliamentary seats (only 70 of

¹⁰⁷ “Prime Minister Moravčík Assesses First 100 Days in Government.” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 June 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ “Elections.” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 August 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ “Slovakia’s Mečiar Asked to Form New Government.” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 31 October 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLEUR [10 November 1998], p. 1.

150) to command a majority (Table III-6); however, this situation was resolved in November 1994, when the left-wing Association of Slovak Workers joined Mečiar's coalition, which became the majority with a total of eighty-three seats in the Parliament.

Table III-6 Elections to the Slovak National Council, October 2, 1994

Slovak National Council (150 seats) Major Political Parties	percent of Votes	number of Seats
HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia)	34.60	61
SV (Common Choice) – a coalition formed of the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS), the Green Party (Szs) and the Farmers Movement (HP)	10.41	18
MK (Hungarian Coalition) – a coalition consisted of Hungarian ethnic parties: Spolužitie, Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (MKDH), and Hungarian Civic Party (MOS)	10.18	17
KDH (Christian Democratic Movement)	10.08	17
DU (Democratic Union)	8.57	15
ZRS (Association of Workers of Slovakia)	7.34	13
SNS (Slovak National Party)	5.40	9

Source: "Major Political Parties and Their Performance in the Last Parliamentary Elections Held on October 2, 1994." 31 August 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.slovakemb.com/general.shtml>> [31 August 1998], p. 6.

The new government took office in December 1994, and Mečiar became Prime Minister for a third time. In an effort to reverse Moravčík's liberalization policies, the Mečiar government returned radio and television communications to state control and blocked the privatization of state-owned companies. As Peter Finn wrote for the *Washington Post Foreign Service*, "Mečiar and his party, the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, were accused of politicizing all aspects of Slovak society, muzzling independent media, enriching party cronies and undermining the constitution."¹¹⁰ These and other measures aimed at centralizing power in Mečiar's hands alarmed a number of Western governments.

In the months that followed, tensions mounted between Mečiar's government and President Kováč because Mečiar did not forgive Kováč for his role in the dismissal of his government in March 1994. This long-lasting dispute between Mečiar and Kováč did not contribute to political stabilization. On May 5, 1995, the Slovak National Council passed a vote of no-confidence in Kováč over his alleged failure to control the activities of the Slovak Information Service, the intelligence agency that had been transferred from Kováč's authority to that of the government. Kováč declared the vote, which had no legal consequence, unconstitutional (it fell ten votes short of the

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

number required to depose the president). Later he said, "nobody and nothing will break me."¹¹¹

In November 1995, Mečiar's government was criticized for passing a new law that reaffirmed that Slovak was the nation's only official language and limited the official use of Hungarian and other languages.

The situation among Slovakia's politicians became even worse after Michal Kováč Jr., the son of President Michal Kováč, was kidnapped from Slovakia by unknown malefactors in the beginning of September 1995. Michal Kováč Jr. was smuggled into Austria where he was freed and then arrested on an international warrant based on a German fraud case in which he was involved. Slovakia's secret intelligence service (SIS), headed by Mečiar's close friend, Ivan Lexa, was suspected of involvement in the abduction of Kováč Jr. and other violations of the law. The abduction has not been solved yet. According to Jane Perlez's article, "Abduction Casts New Doubts on Slovakia," published in *The New York Times*, "Almost immediately, two Slovak police investigators said they had linked the incident to the country's intelligence service. This fed suspicion that Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar had arranged the kidnapping to embarrass his chief political rival, President Michal Kováč.... The new American Ambassador to Slovakia, Ralph R. Johnson, said that if the country wanted to join

¹¹¹ "Slovakia: May 1998," *Hilfe Country Report*, May 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 8.

Western democratic organizations, the kidnapping of Mr. Kováč ... and the killing of the witness, Robert Remiáš, needed to be ‘pursued with determination.’”¹¹²

In December 1996, another manipulation of Slovakia’s constitution occurred, when František Gaulieder, only a month after he had left the HZDS, was deprived of his Parliamentary seat. The Slovak Constitutional Court declared that dismissing Gaulieder from the Parliament was illegal, but Parliament did not overturn the decision and did not return Gaulieder to his Parliamentary post.

In May 1997, the Interior Minister Gustav Krajčí deleted the fourth ballot question from the nationwide referendum. This deletion enabled a change in the way presidents were elected. As this concerned the country’s entrance into NATO, the government declared the referendum invalid due to poor voter turnout (only ten percent of eligible voters participated in the referendum).¹¹³

During 1997 and 1998, NATO, the EU and other international organizations and Western governments strongly criticized Mečiar’s administration for its questionable commitment to democracy, and the rule of law, and for its human rights record. For example, the U.S. Ambassador Ralph Johnson, in his July 14, 1998, speech, criticized Slovakia for the lack of tolerance, absence of the rule of law, and Slovakia’s trend toward

¹¹² Jane Perlez, “Abduction Casts New Doubts on Slovakia Chief,” *The New York Times*, 17 December 1996. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹¹³ “Concept of Political Normality Changing in Slovakia – Týden,” *CTK National News Wire*, 2 June 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

centralization of power over day-to-day life in Slovakia.¹¹⁴ In response to Johnson's criticism, Mečiar compared Johnson with Stephan Chervonenko, the Soviet Ambassador to Prague during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and "claimed that he was feeding the U.S. State Department with lies about Slovakia."¹¹⁵

However, Slovakia did not take any action to correct the failings that Johnson referred to, and after President Kovač's term expired on March 2, 1998, the country was plunged into a constitutional crisis. According to the Slovak Constitution, the government became an enormously powerful administrative body with greater powers. For instance, on March 4, 1998, Mečiar granted amnesty to people involved in the kidnapping of former President Michal Kováč's son in 1995, put a stop to legal action regarding the thwarting of the referendum in 1997, and also recalled at least twenty-nine ambassadors.¹¹⁶ "The EU statement called the failed referendum and the 1995 kidnapping of Kováč Jr. 'factors in the [European] commission's assessment that Slovakia did not meet the ... criteria' for EU membership."¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Ralph Johnson, "Door to NATO Will Open to Slovakia in Future," *Amb. Johnson Remarks 7/14 On U.S.-Slovakia Relations*. 16 July 1997. Available [Online]: <<http://pes.eunet.cz/97/29/0029ar17.htm>> [26 May 1998], pp. 1-2.

¹¹⁵ "Slovakia Criticizes U.S. Ambassador for Unwanted Remarks," *CTK National News Wire*, 26 March 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹¹⁶ Ross Larsen, Slovakia: "The Road toward Dictatorship." 11 March 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.praguepost.cz/archive/news31198a.html>> [30 July 1998], p. 2.

¹¹⁷ Siegfried Morkowitz, "EU Blasts Mečiar's Amnesties." 18 March 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.praguepost.cz/archive/slov31898a.html>> [25 March 1998], p. 1.

In May 1998, Mečiar's ruling coalition approved a controversial new election law, declaring that if a member of the coalition failed to cross the Parliamentary threshold of at least five percent of popular votes, the rest of the coalition parties would be viewed as if they registered for the election on their own. This means that if these small parties, coalition partners, failed to get five percent of the vote, they would be excluded from Parliament, and their seats would be divided among the winning parties. Mečiar's government received far-ranging criticism for this unpopular decision. For example, on June 22, 1998, U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin said,

The new election law approved by the Slovak Parliament in May fails to meet international standards and should be changed.... In its current form, the law could result in "unfree and unfair elections," not least because it increases the authority of the Interior Ministry, which disrupted polling in two referendums last year.¹¹⁸

Western democracies also viewed a new amendment of the election law as antidemocratic. This amendment forbade any independent media from broadcasting any information or political news thirty days prior to the election; however, state television and radio stations *could* broadcast without limitation, except for the last forty-eight hours before elections. In response to the new election law, Andrej Hryc, director of the independent radio station *Radio Twist*, said, "I have to censure all news personally although it is forbidden by the constitution." This meant that Mečiar and his HZDS to

¹¹⁸ Dennis Moran, "Slovak Brief." 1 July 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.praguepost.cz/archive/slov70198a.html> [10 November 1998], p. 1.

their benefit actually controlled all of Slovakia's independent media.¹¹⁹ In August 1998, Mečiar's effort to control the media led to the suspicion of HZDS and SIS involvement in politicizing the privately-owned TV station, *Markíza*, an ownership dispute that later became a symbol of freedom and democracy in Slovakia.¹²⁰ The last attempt of the HZDS government to prevent the Slovak Democratic Coalition from participating in the elections was also considered against the law in a democratic state. In August 1998, the HZDS protested to the Slovakian Supreme Court against registering its only rival, the SDK. According to the HZDS, the SDK was not a standard political party but a coalition of five parties and could not register for the elections. However, according to the Supreme Court, the fact that the SDK was not a standard political party did not mean that it could not be registered. To exclude the HZDS's strongest opponent from the September 1998 elections would have meant a complete end of democracy in Slovakia.¹²¹ According to the British Helsinki Human Rights Group's election-procedures report, senators D'Amato and Smith of the US Congress Helsinki Committee stated on October 2, 1998, that "Vladimír Mečiar's regime expediently sought to provoke

¹¹⁹ Karel Wolf, "Nezávislá slovenská média musí mlčet (Slovak Independent Media Must Be Silent)," 3 September 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/980903/mf63857818.html>> [3 September 1998], p. 1. And Daniela Bartošová, "Televize na Slovensku je zpolitizovaná (Television in Slovakia is Politicized)," 7 September 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/ln/1998/980907/ln68762684.html>> [8 September 1998], p. 1.

¹²⁰ "Slovenská demokratická koalícia obvinila SIS a HZDS z pokusu zmocniť sa televízie Markíza (Slovak Democratic Coalition Accused SIS and HZDS of an Attempt to Seize the Television Station Markíza)," 17 September 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/article.asp?id=59639>> [16 September 1998], p. 1.

¹²¹ Peter Schutz, Mečiar se na poslední chvíli před volbami snaží zbavit opozice (Mečiar Tries to Get Rid of Opposition at the Last Moment before Elections)." *Lidové Noviny*, 13 August 1998, p. 9.

chaos and disorder in the pre-election period and create an atmosphere of insecurity, instability and tension.”¹²²

However, in the 1998 elections, only six of seventeen registered parties, movements and coalitions obtained five percent or more of the popular vote.¹²³ An opposition of four parties and coalitions, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL), the Slovak Hungarian Coalition (SMK), and the Party of Civic Understanding (SOP)--winning ninety-three seats in the 150-seat Slovak National Council--agreed that none of them would enter into negotiations with Premier Mečiar’s HZDS, which emerged as the single largest party in Parliament, winning only forty-three seats (Table III-8).¹²⁴

The HZDS as a Parliamentary winner lost a chance to form a new government and became a government opposition. One of many factors in Mečiar’s defeat was the failure of the Slovak Worker’s Party (ZRS), one of the HZDS coalition partners, which did not reach the threshold of five percent of popular votes needed to re-enter the Parliament. The ZRS received only 1.3 percent of the vote. The opposition of four parties became a government coalition and formed a new cabinet with more than

122 “Election Procedures.” October 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.bhrg.org/slovakia/slovakia1998/procedures.htm> [8 November 1998], p. 1.

123 “Politici deklarajú vôlu splniť želania voličov (Politicians Declared Their Wiliness to Fulfill Voters’ Wishes).” 28 September 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.sme.sk/article.asp?=60740> [28 September 1998], p. 1.

124 Siegfried Morkowitz, “The Prague Post Online: Slovakia’s Democratic Revolution.” 30 September 1998. Available [Online]: www.praguepost.cz/news93098a.html [3 November 1998], pp. 1-3.

three-fifths of the 150 seats in Parliament, allowing it to pass all bills and elect a president.

Table III-8 Elections to the Slovak National Council, September 24 and 25, 1998

Slovak National Council (150 seats) Major Political Parties	percent of Votes	number of Seats
HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia)	27.0	43
SDK (Slovak Democratic Coalition)	26.33	42
SDL (the Slovak Communist Party)	14.66	23
SMK (Slovak Hungarian Coalition)	9.12	15
SNS (Slovak National Party)	9.07	14
SOP (Party of Civic Understanding)	8.01	13

Source: "SME Online: Politici deklarajú vôle splniť želania voličou (Politicians Declared Their Wiliness to Fulfill Voters' Wishes)." 28 September 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/article.asp?id=60740>> [28 September 1998], p. 1.

After the results of the elections were released Dzurinda said, "The vote was a new hope for Slovakia." Together with other opposition parties he wanted to return a "democratic face to Slovakia."¹²⁵ Mečiar, hiring internationally famous artists and models, such as German model Claudia Schiffer, French actors Jean-Paul Belmondo, Jr., and Gerard Depardieu, and Italian star Claudia Cardinale, for his HZDS's campaign appearance, won the elections by the narrowest of margins. Nevertheless, Mečiar did not

¹²⁵ "Mikulas Dzurinda Likely to Succeed Meciar as Slovak Premier," *CTK National News Wire*, 28 September 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

gain the two-third majority of votes in the Parliament needed to form a new government, and he was defeated by the opposition and left the political scene. During an interview on Slovak Television, STV, Mečiar conceded defeat by singing, “Farewell, I leave you. I never hurt, I never hurt any of you.” Not able to hand over the Prime Minister office personally to his successor Mikuláš Dzurinda (former Transport Minister in Jozef Moravčík’s 1994 cabinet), and leaving no money in the government coffers to run many ministries, Mečiar declared he was not interested in any political position including the presidential post. Mečiar gave up his deputy’s mandate to his ally Ivan Lexa (of the HZDS) and former Chief of the Slovak Intelligence Agency (SIS), and “disappeared” from the political scene. After four years, the era of Mečarism, Mečiar’s political and economic path, “during which Slovakia was repeatedly censured by the United States and EU countries for abuses of democracy,”¹²⁶ ended in Slovakia.

As Milan Galanda, Slovak attorney, said, “there is a chance ahead for us to begin to build up a tradition based on tolerance of opponents and enable opposition to share not only the control of power but also the control of public affairs so they will take responsibility for the country and its citizens.”¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Siegfried Morkowitz, “Goodbye to Meciarism,” *The Prague Post*, 30 September 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹²⁷ Milan Galanda, “SME Online: O parlamentnej demokracie a vytváraní parlamentných tradícií (About Parliamentary Democracy and Creating Parliamentary Traditions).” 29 November 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/aarticle.asp?id=64465>> [28 November 1998], p. 1.

c) A Brief Economic Status and Goals

During Czechoslovak statehood, the Slovak economy was more agrarian and less developed than its Czech counterpart. Under the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia, the Communists leadership decided to build up agrarian Slovakia by locating heavy industries there that were mostly dependent on Russian oil and gas. These different economic outlooks, compounded by Prague's centralized governmental control, produced discontent among Slovaks regarding the future structure of the new democratic state.

After 1989, during the economic transformation to a market economy, Prague made many important decisions which were unpopular to Slovaks, due to the increasing unemployment rate which soared three times higher than in the Czech lands. Slovaks soon became increasingly uncomfortable with their role in the new, independent country and, as I mentioned earlier, the Slovaks did not agree with the Czechs' proposed rapid transition to a market economy. In 1997 unemployment was 12.5 percent, and for 1998 was estimated between 11.8 and 2.3 percent.¹²⁸

Under Mečiar's leadership and his economic policy, the process of privatization slowed in Slovakia. However, after the completion of several large investment projects, such as the Mochovce nuclear power plant and the Slovnaft refining firm, and having attracted sufficient foreign loans for investment, the Slovak economy

¹²⁸ Ron Orol and Peter Smith, "Slovakia on an Economic Precipice." 30 September 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.praguepost.cz/busi93098b.html>> [3 October 1998], p. 1.

has experienced several years of exuberant GDP growth and a low inflation level of five to six percent in 1996 and 1997. Also, the GDP grew 6.2 percent annually.¹²⁹

Like the Czech Republic, the top economic priority of Slovakia is the EU membership. Slovakia is also making an effort to become a member of the Organization of Eastern and Central Development (OECD). But, despite quite a fast growing economy in 1996 and 1997, Slovakia because of its political instability has been relegated to the second rank of countries seeking EU and OECD membership. In the next few months, Slovakia will have to face a difficult economic situation, a legacy of Mečiar's cabinet, which left *no* money to run the government. According to a Slovak National Bank (SNB) announcement, "the government officially has no money left in its accounts. And, with unemployment running near an all-time high of 14.1 percent and Slovakia's current account deficit of 1.1 billion Sk (\$30 million), or roughly eleven percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), drastic measures will be required to rescue the economy."¹³⁰

d) The Basis of Contemporary Democratic Civil-Military Relations

As I also pointed out earlier, as with the Czech Republic, Slovakia's top foreign policy goals since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 has been integration into NATO. This is also a basic step for accelerating the building of a modern military and improving civil-military relations.

¹²⁹ "Slovakia Economy GDP to Continue Growing." *CTK Business News Wire*, 18 June 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹³⁰ Siegfried Morkowitz, "Goodbye to Meciarism," *The Prague Post*, 30 September 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 2.

Slovakia's military prestige in the public's eyes, the defense reforms, and the transformation of the Slovak Armed Forces were considered rather successful for NATO integration, but political instability has limited the civilian control over the military. Exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of NATO enlargement and the attempt to politicize the Slovak Armed Forces (SAR) by Mečiar, Ivan Gašparovič, Chairman of National Council, and Jozef Gajdoš, State Secretary of Defense, brought further negative developments in civil-military relations.

(1) The State Budget of Slovakia's Defense Department. As in the Czech Republic, the new accounting system, PPBS (Programming Planning Budgeting System), has been successfully implemented in the Slovakian defense department, and the state budget of the Ministry of Defense has become a significant tool in controlling the military.

However, in 1997, Mečiar's inefficient allocation of resources for bolstering the military led former Chief of General Staff Gen. Col. Tuchyňa to prepare a request for early retirement, protesting the inadequate financial resources allocated to the military to achieve its training goals and maintain combat readiness.¹³¹ According to a U.S. expert team, the Army of the Slovak Republic needs seventeen milliards of Slovak crowns annually for its basic performance. The following data (Table

¹³¹ "Vývoj rozpočtu Ministerstva obrany SR v rokoch 1995-1998 (Development of the State Budget of the Defense Department of the Slovak Republic from 1995 to 1998)," *Denník Smena*, (16 September 1998), Section: Téma Dňa, p. 1.

III-9) summarize developments of the State Budget of the Defense Department from 1995 to 1998 (in mld Sk).

Table III-9 Slovakian Military Expenditure Rate from 1995 through 1998

YEAR	EXPENDITURE (in mld Sk)	EXPENDITURE RATE OF MOD (in GDP)
1995	12,052, 518	2.496
1996	13,412, 581	2.307
1997	14,339, 653	2.193
1998	14,053, 731	1.921

Source: "Vývoj rozpočtu Ministerstva obrany SR v rokoch 1995-1998 (Development of the State Budget of the Defense Department of the Slovak Republic from 1995 to 1998)," *Denník SME*, (16 September 1998), Section: Téma Dňa, p. 1.

(2) Limitations on Civil-Military Relations: Politicizing the Slovak Military. Even if one argued that Slovakia's defense reforms and military transformation were successful enough for NATO integration, the military image and civilian control of the military were not. Similarly to the Czech Republic, Slovakia went through several organizational and personnel changes, (Table III-10) which did not always contribute to an effective transformation.

Table III-10 THE RULERS OF THE DEFENSE REFORMS AND CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS FROM 1993 TO 1998

President of the Slovak Republic

Michal Kováč	1/1993 – 3/1998
Vacancy	3/1998 – present

Prime Ministers

Vladimír Mečiar	1/1993 – 3/1994
Josef Moravčík	3/1994 – 12/1994
Vladimír Mečiar	12/1994 – 10/1998
Mikuláš Dzurinda	10/1998 – present

Ministers of Defense

Imrich Andrejčák	3/1993 – 3/1994
Pavol Kanis	3/1994 – 12/1994
Jan Sitek	12/1994 – 10/1998
Pavol Kanis	10/1998 – present

Commander of the Army of the Slovak Republic

Lt. General Julius Humaj	1/1993 – 9/1994
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Chiefs of Staff of the Army of the Slovak Republic (since September 1, 1994)

General Colonel Jozef Tuchyňa	9/1994 – 9/1998
General Major Marián Mikluš	9/1998 – present

However, gaps in Slovakia's constitutional law regarding the military are the most evident problems in the civilian sector controlling the military. This recently resulted in Mečiar's administration politicizing the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic. According to the Slovak independent daily newspaper, *SME*, the Slovak Armed Forces and the officers corps were highly disappointed during the third Mečiar government because the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic were among the best prepared post-Communist countries seeking entry into the NATO alliance. Yet they were excluded from NATO and also could garner little public respect.

Slovakia's successful participation in PfP military exercises such as Cooperative Nugget in the US, and several communication exercises such as Combined Endeavor and Cooperative Banners 97 in Norway, and the PfP exercise Cooperative Key 97 in Slovakia, certainly proved Slovak military preparedness for NATO membership. Because of Mečiar antidemocratic policy, Slovakia was not invited into NATO and this caused great disillusionment among the military personnel.¹³²

Recently, another problem of government policy--an attempt to politicize the military--characterized Mečiar's continuing unstable democracy and civilian control over the military in Slovakia. The ongoing Slovakia constitutional problem (no Slovak president since March 2, 1998) gave Mečiar and Gašparovič a chance to politicize the military during an absence of Minister of Defense J. Sitek, who at the end of August 1998 was on vacation in Mexico. A primary example of such politicizing happened when the Chairman of National Council Gašparovič (based on Prime Minister Mečiar and State Secretary Defense Gajdoš's recommendation), removed the Chief of General Staff (CGS), General Tuchyňa. Then they named a new CGS, Colonel Marián Mikluš, a supporter of HZDS, and promoted him to General. Mečiar's decision violated the law because the change in the post of CGS, according to constitutional law, could be made by the President or the Chairman of the National Council only when it was based


¹³² "HZDS Pred Volbami ovládlo vedenie armády (HZDS Have Gained Control of the Military Leadership)," 31 August 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/article.asp?dat=392&id=57707>> [31 August 1998], p. 1.

on the recommendation of the Minister of Defense.¹³³ The change in the post of the CGS had already been discussed and announced by Minister Sitek before he left the country, yet Minister Sitek had recommended General Vesterický as a new CGS. Mečiar, however, supported Colonel Mikluš. At that time, CGS General Tuchyňa refused to hand over the post of CGS until the Minister of Defense returned, and so Slovakia had two CGS's for that period. After Minister Sitek returned, Mečiar publicly stated that if Minister Sitek did not accept his proposed change in the post of CGS, he would be recalled. In order not to deepen the political crisis before the upcoming election on September 25 and 26, 1998, Minister Sitek accepted Mečiar's proposal and named General Mikluš as the new Chief of Staff of the Slovak Armed Forces.¹³⁴

¹³³ Wolf, Karol. "Mečiarova vláda údajně porušila platné zákony (Mečiar's Government Allegedly Violated Valid Laws)," *Dnes*, (21 August 1998), p. 8.

¹³⁴ "Výmena náčeníka generálneho štábu Armády SR sa uskutečnila mocenským, a nie právným spôsobom (Replacement of the Chief of the General Staff of the Slovakian Army Has Been Realized by a Power Not Legal)," 31 August 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/aarticle.asp?dat=392&id=57704>> [3 September 1998], p. 1-2.

Figure III-4 DEFENSE REFORMS OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC, 1997-1998



E. CONCLUSION

When democracy returned to Czechoslovakia in 1989, nobody could have predicted that it would return for only two years. Now, after Czechoslovakia has split into two countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, it seems that the democracy shared by the two different nations, the Czechs and Slovaks, split as well. Presently the Czech Republic seems to have a stable, consolidated democracy; Slovakia does not. Before NATO's foreign ministers in Brussels on December 16, 1997, Jeffrey Simon, a leading expert in Central and Eastern Europe Affairs from the U.S. National Defense University

Institute for National Strategic Studies, said, "the Czech Republic was functioning as a healthy democracy."¹³⁵ At that time, the situation in Slovakia was completely different.

Mečiar's intolerance toward people with opposing opinions and his increasing centralization of power led to Slovakia's exclusion from the first wave of NATO enlargement and the first round of European Union entry negotiations. However, this has prompted five Slovak opposition parties, concerned about their country's increasing international isolation, to unite their forces to oppose Prime Minister Mečiar and his Mečiarism. After the U.S. Ambassador to Slovakia, Ralph Johnson, explained why the US could not support Slovakia's NATO membership, Mečiar said, "The USA was conducting destructive activities towards Slovakia through its Ambassador."¹³⁶ Mečiar's policy continued, and it was clear that while he governed, Slovakia would never join NATO and the EU. This led an opposition bloc of five parties, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDK), to criticize publicly a government that did not take all the international concerns about Slovakia's democracy seriously:

¹³⁵ "Czech Republic Functions as a Healthy Democracy – U.S. Expert." *CTK National News Wire*, 15 December 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹³⁶ "Government Spokeswoman Not Commenting on EU Document." 15 July 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

Jozef Šesták, state secretary at the Slovak Foreign Ministry, misleads Slovak citizens when he blames the alleged double standards of the West for Slovakia's failure in the integration process. The government has failed completely in pursuing the issue of integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. Slovakia has been excluded from NATO expansion because of the government's arrogant methods of ruling and its unwillingness to respect democratic principles. Therefore, Slovakia has found itself in the second group of the countries to be integrated into EU. The government has not been able to fulfill the pledges made in its policy statement.”¹³⁷

Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley's interpretation of Juan J. Linz's theories can help us understand our findings when comparing and evaluating democracy in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. As Linz pointed out, a political system can be considered as democratic when:

it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by non-violent means their claim to rule... without excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from expressing their preference.¹³⁸

According to this definition, to compare the Czech and Slovak Republic, while the Czech political scene has been healthy and competitive, Slovakia's government under Mečiar's administration has not respected the role of the other political institutions and has treated the opposition as an enemy. Also, the Czech Republic can be viewed as a

¹³⁷ “Opposition Says Government's Foreign Policy a Failure.” 18 July 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹³⁸ Michael Burton, Richard Gunter and John Higley, “Introduction: Elite Transformation and Democratic Regimes, in John Higley and Richard Gunter, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (New York: Central European Press, 1992), p.1.

consolidated Parliamentary democracy with a fully-implemented rule of law, human rights, and freedom of the press. The June 1998 Parliamentary election in the Czech Republic also plainly showed government tolerance of other Parliamentary parties (left-right government).

In their introduction on elite transformations and democratic regimes, in *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe*, scholars Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley distinctly describe an “unconsolidated democracy.” They write:

Where there is no real elite consensus about democratic rules of the game and institutions, and where elites are instead disunified in the sense that they distrust and have little traffic with one another, we may speak of an unconsolidated democracy.... What principally distinguishes unconsolidated from consolidated democracies is, in short, the absence of elite consensual unity.¹³⁹

Where the Czech Republic succeeded in democratic principles and civil-military relations, Slovakia has failed (i.e., intolerance of opposition parties, arrogance of Mečiar’s governing style, government violations of constitutional law and repeated disdain and disrespect for the country’s constitutional court, centralization of power, and the politicization of all Slovakian social life). Jeffrey Simon’s studies on civilian control of the military in Central and Eastern Europe show that Slovakia did not meet his first and second conditions necessary for effective democratic control and management of the

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

military. First, there is no clear division of authority between the president and the government in the constitution, especially when Prime Minister Mečiar assumed most of the presidential rights and became Commander-in-Chief. Because of the Slovak constitutional crisis (no President since March 2, 1998), it is not clear who commands and controls the military and promotes military officers, as was evident in the nomination of the new Slovakian's CGS, Colonel Mikluš. Secondly, the post of the Minister of Defense is held by a civilian minister, but there is no distinct government control of the General Staff and military commanders through defense ministries. This is true because there were no clear rights between the Minister of Defense and his state secretary. State secretary Gajdoš (HZDS), for example, controlled arms acquisition from the settlement of the Russian Federation's debt toward Slovakia for the damage caused to Czechoslovakia by the Soviet troops' occupying its territory from 1968 to 1992, and there was poor coordination between them within the Ministry of Defense.

While civilian control of the military in the Czech Republic is successfully maintained, in Slovakia, because of its political problems, it is not. Even though the Slovak military is being successfully transformed, Slovakia needs to improve its political system and needs to control the military effectively. Moreover, the military must not be politicized. Where there is an attempt to do so, a consolidated democracy cannot be established and maintained.

IV. STATE TRANSITION TO NATO ALLIANCE

The enlargement of NATO will strengthen security, freedom, and peace in Europe. It will secure the gains of democracy in Central Europe.¹⁴⁰
-- Senator Bob Dole (R-KS)

A. INTRODUCTION

The North Atlantic Treaty, the Washington Treaty, was signed in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949 by twelve countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.¹⁴¹ Since then, NATO has been enlarged three times to its current membership of sixteen nations. Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952, Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. On July 8 and 9, 1997, at the Madrid Summit, following changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1990, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) formally invited another three countries—former Warsaw Pact nations, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, to become NATO members (Figure IV-1), fifteen years after the last NATO enlargement. Since then the international order, security system, and the world political map has changed significantly. These changes in Central and Eastern Europe also created a new security environment among current NATO members,

¹⁴⁰ Bob Dole, "Enlargement Endorsing NATO Enlargement: Remarks to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council." 25 June 1996. Available [Online]: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/op_980219_endorse.html [17 August 1998], p.1.

¹⁴¹ Lord Ismay, "Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty," *NATO: The First Five Years 1949 – 1954* (Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht, 1954), p. 11.

countries invited to join NATO, countries excluded from NATO membership (i.e., Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovenia), as well as non-member countries, such as Russia and Ukraine. Today it is extraordinarily important for those countries excluded from full NATO membership that close cooperation and communication with NATO continues and intensifies in the near future.




Figure IV-1 A Map of NATO Enlargement, 1949 to 1999

Source: "The Admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO Will Change the Political and Military Dynamics of Europe." *The New York Times* (1 May 1998), p. 1.

As NATO enlarges, it must continue to develop its plan with non-NATO countries and must find its new role in a post-Cold War era. With no clear enemy, NATO must avoid creating new dividing lines that could reignite security uncertainties in Europe. NATO's new mission must encourage cooperation in addressing common security problems. For instance, the creation of agreements, institutions, and organizations, such as those listed below, could develop mutual relationship:

- 1) Enhancing the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);
- 2) Enhancing a role of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI),
- 3) Signing the *Founding Act* (an agreement on mutual relations, cooperation and security between NATO and the Russian Federation);
- 4) The Partnership for Peace program (PfP);
- 5) Concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF);
- 6) The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC); and
- 7) The Western European Union (WEU).

This fourth chapter will mainly discuss the chronological events and the pros and cons of NATO enlargement, as well as the Czech Republic's and Slovakia's efforts to gain NATO membership which they see as requirements for a new "security architecture" drawn in Central and Eastern Europe. Analyzing these needs for a new security in all of Europe, this chapter suggests that not all of the newly-emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have met the minimal requirements for early NATO membership. Although most of these countries' policy priorities were clearly laid down—they wanted to join NATO—their efforts were not always as effective as expected by the Western democracies. For example, in 1994 and early 1995, the "hot" candidates for the first round of NATO enlargement were the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia, four countries of the *Visegrád Group*. But several months later, Slovakia's NATO membership was uncertain because of the country's anti-democratic practices which resulted in Slovakia's exclusion from NATO's first round of enlargement in 1997.

The end of communism, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the termination of the Cold War, the spread of democracy in Europe, German unification, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the instability in Central and Eastern Europe gave NATO and other

security organizations, such as the OSCE, the WEU and the UN, a new opportunity to build a new security architecture all over Europe.

B. FROM THE WARSAW PACT TO NATO

Reintegration with the West, from which Czechoslovakia was torn in 1938 by National Socialistic Germany and again in 1948 and in 1968 by communism was Czechoslovakia's foreign policy priority.

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact dissolution in 1991, there was a need to develop a new security arrangement in Europe.¹⁴² The first attempt to address the new security realities created by these new flourishing European democracies occurred in the middle of 1990. Calling for a restructuring of its military forces and a reorientation of its strategy and security policy, NATO at its July 1990 summit in London, declared that "it no longer considered Russia an adversary and announced a new program for cooperation open to all the former Communist states of the East."¹⁴³ Since that time, enhancing security and stability throughout Europe and deciding not to follow the Warsaw Pact into dissolution, NATO, called by Czech President Václav Havel "a guarantor of Euro-

¹⁴² Jeffrey Simon, ed., "NATO, Warsaw Pact, and European Security," European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989 (Washington D.C.: The National Defense University Press, 1991), p. 45.

¹⁴³ "United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO: Management and Enlargement." June 1995. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/europe/chapter_2.html>. [16 September 1998], p. 7.

American civilization and thus a pillar of global security,”¹⁴⁴ began its historical transformation that continues today.

For example, NATO’s July 1990 London Declaration by the NAC led to the establishment of the first formal dialogue and consultation between NATO and the newly independent countries of the former Warsaw Pact Treaty (WTO).¹⁴⁵ On November 28, 1990, Czechoslovakia received a status of “NATO associate delegate,” and on March 21, 1991, President Václav Havel was the first head of the former Warsaw Pact country to visit Brussels NATO headquarters.¹⁴⁶ In June 1991 in Copenhagen, declaring that “We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent. Our objectives is to help create a Europe whole and free,”¹⁴⁷ NATO took another step to meet its challenge. In response to both, NATO’s London and Copenhagen meetings, NATO, five months later, at the Rome Summit adopted a new security Strategic Concept committing it to a broad approach to keep new Europe free, stable, and undivided. To institutionalize NATO’s commitment to the new Europe, the November 1991 NATO Summit in Rome created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which established a new institutional framework for political and security cooperation between

¹⁴⁴ John Omicinski, “NATO Expansion Expected at Summit, Could Make or Break Clinton Presidency.” *Gannet News Service*, 3 July 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [24 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ “NATO Today,” NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1992), p. 15.

¹⁴⁶ “Czech Republic Started NATO Accession Talks One Year Ago.” *CTK National News Wire*, 22 September 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [30 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁴⁷ “United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO: Management and Enlargement.” June 1995. Available [Online]: <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/europe/chapter_2.html>. [16 September 1998], p. 1.

the two Western and Eastern blocs. The inaugural meeting of the NACC began on December 20, 1991, the day of the Soviet Union's dissolved, only five months after the disintegration of NATO's principal adversary during the Cold War, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).¹⁴⁸ The concluding meeting of the NACC took place in Sintra, Portugal, on May 30, 1997, followed by the inaugural meeting of the Euro Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC replaced the NACC and became a new cooperative mechanism between NATO and all NACC and PfP countries.¹⁴⁹

1. Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON

Naturally, after the uprooting of communism in Czechoslovakia and the spread of democratic freedom, people freely and openly expressed their feelings about the 1968 Prague Spring. The Czech and Slovak people hated to be part of a military alliance that once invaded them and then for more than twenty years remained as a "watchdog." This explain why the Czech and Slovak people did not trust any military alliance in the beginning of 1990s and also why Czechoslovak President Václav Havel wanted to dissolve both military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On May 14, 1955, the Warsaw Pact, the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was founded in Warsaw by the eight nations: Albania, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. The Warsaw

¹⁴⁸ "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)," NATO Handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press, October 1995), p. 43.

¹⁴⁹ "Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Sintra, Portugal - 29 May 1997." 1997. Available [Online]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-065e.htm>> [10 November 1998]. p. 1.

Pact was formed as a counterpart to NATO several days after West Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In 1990, Havel characterized the Warsaw Pact as "a remnant of the past which came into being as a typical product of Stalinist expansionism."¹⁵⁰ He declared that the Warsaw Pact had no further reasons to exist. The issue of dissolving the Warsaw Pact became more and more discussed by the end of 1990. Commenting on the existence of the Warsaw Pact, Havel said:

Dinosaurs might be nice for museums, but they are not for our time, and the Warsaw Pact is a dinosaur. It is hard for anyone in our country, and not just ours, to hear the words Warsaw Pact and not think of 1968 (when Warsaw Pact troops crushed Czechoslovakia's pro-democracy movement). How can we as free nations want to remain a member of the Warsaw Pact?¹⁵¹

Eight months after this statement, on July 1, 1991, Václav Havel opened a six-nation meeting, in Prague, that dissolved the Warsaw Pact. Contrary to all previous meetings, which mainly focused on future activities, the Prague Warsaw Pact meeting was the last one. Thus after the thirty-six-year existence of this military-political treaty, the main task of the session was to sign a protocol that formally ended all Warsaw Pact activities. Only six of eight founding nations' delegations (Albania withdrew in 1968 and the German Democratic Republic's membership ended with the reunification of Germany

¹⁵⁰ "Warsaw Pact 'To Be Scrapped by 1992,'" *Guardian*, 21 November 1990. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁵¹ "E. Europe Seeks to End Warsaw Pact; Alliances: The Leaders of Former Soviet Satellites Are Pressing for the Abolition of the Military Organization," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 November 1990. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

in 1990) were represented by Czechoslovak President Václav Havel, Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev, Polish President Lech Walesa, Romanian President Ion Iliescu, Soviet Vice-president Gennadi Yanayev and Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall. The military structure of the Warsaw Pact was ended with the signing of the Budapest Protocol on March 31, 1991.¹⁵²

The collapse of the Soviet empire and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact greatly disrupted the economy of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Existing economic structures died away quite naturally. The price deregulation and abolition of the Moscow-managed trade exchange ended the Soviet Union's control of all Warsaw Pact countries' economies. On June 28, 1991, one month before the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), founded in 1949, disbanded.¹⁵³

2. The Visegrád Group Four

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, with the persisting risks and uncertainties in the Soviet Union, the Balkans and the Middle East, created a security vacuum in the territory between the current eastern frontier of NATO and the border of the former Soviet Union. The "Visegrád Group," sometimes called "the Visegrád Four," former Soviet bloc countries Czechoslovakia (since 1993, the Czech

¹⁵² "Warsaw Pact Disbanded." *Polish News Bulletin*, 2 July 1991. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁵³ "Comecon, Warsaw Pact Formally Disband." *Facts on File World News Digest*, 11 July 1991. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

Republic and Slovakia), Poland, and Hungary were first united at a meeting in Visegrád, Hungary, in February 1991. They agreed on a joint approach to security and foreign policy issues to integrate better into the Western European democratic civilization.¹⁵⁴ They were the first nations from the post-Communist countries to suggest the Warsaw Pact's dissolution. In contrast to other regional groups that also emerged after the Visegrád Group, such as the Central European Initiative, the Council of Baltic Sea countries, or the Black Sea Community, and the Barents Sea Community, only the Visegrád group "developed effective forms of political cooperation and spawn common economic projects."¹⁵⁵ Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON in 1991, membership of the Washington Treaty has become the Visegrád Group's priority. When the Visegrád Group instituted its most spectacular success, the Central European Free Trade Zone Agreement (CEFTA), in 1993, which lowered trade barriers, the Visegrád countries realized their greatest achievement toward democracy and a free market economy.¹⁵⁶

3. Brussels NATO Summit in 1994: Partnership for Peace (PfP)

In the framework of the NACC, the first summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council since 1991, held in Brussels on January 10 and 11, 1994, provided a reason for

¹⁵⁴ Stephen Borsody, "Central Europe and the European Union," *The New Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 294-295.

¹⁵⁵ Juliusz Urbanowicz, "The Visegrad Group: Alliance on Thin Ice." *The Warsaw Voice*, 30 January 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁵⁶ Carol Skalnik Leff, "Domestic Reform and Integration with the West: The Triple Transition and International Relations," *The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), p. 264.

believing that transforming NATO made a crucially important and ongoing contribution to Europe's evolving security and defense arrangements.¹⁵⁷ The Brussels NATO Summit gave real agreement to the promise in the 1991 Maastrich treaty founding the European Union that the Western European Union would be developed as the defense component of the EU, while at the same time being the instrument for strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

The most important steps were taken in Brussels when NATO adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP) proposal, under which individual countries, mainly from the former Warsaw Pact, including Russia, established yet stronger relationships with NATO. The Brussels Summit also declared that NATO was open to new members in the future. The proposal offered all former Warsaw Pact countries limited associations with NATO. The main goals of PfP program are described below. They included:

- facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
- maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or responsibility of the CSCE;

¹⁵⁷ Jeffrey Simon, "NATO Enlargement: Blazing the Trail," *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), pp. 15-16.

- the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁵⁸

All four Visegrád countries were seeking an immediate security guarantee of full membership in NATO, and the PfP program did not satisfy their efforts. However, the Visegrád Group meeting on January 7, 1994, in Warsaw, prior to President Clinton's visit to Prague on January 11 and 12, 1994, considered that the American PfP proposal was "a step in the right direction, was conducive to the idea of mutual security and led to the expansion of cooperation between NATO and the states of Central-Eastern Europe."¹⁵⁹

President Havel hosted another important meeting of Visegrád group countries, which met with President Clinton, in Prague, on January 12, 1994. After Clinton launched the U.S. PfP program for former Soviet bloc countries, Havel declared that: "Yalta went down in history as a symbol of the division of Europe. I would be happy if today the city of Prague emerged as a symbol of Europe's standing in alliance."¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ "Aims of the Partnership," NATO Handbook (NATO Office of Information and Press, October 1995), p. 52.

¹⁵⁹ "Polish Minister: Partnership for Peace Step in Right Direction." *BBC Summary of World Broadcast*, 10 January 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [9 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁶⁰ Christian Chaise, "E. European Leaders Sign on for Partnership Plan." *Agence France Presse*, 12 January 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [9 November 1998], p. 2.

The U.S.-sponsored PfP program brought US financial aid into the participating states' infrastructures in their political, economic and military sectors. According to Clinton, the PfP initiative "would reinforce the development of democratic practices such as respect for human rights and civilian control of armed forces."¹⁶¹ The proposal certainly helps participating countries align their militaries with those in NATO, bridging the gap of compatibility and interoperability between armed forces in the Western democracies and former Warsaw Pact countries. The PfP program became more intensive in 1996 and 1997 and achieved great results in preparing new candidates for early NATO membership.

4. Madrid NATO Summit in 1997

The fifth NATO Summit since 1989, held on July 8 and 9, 1997, was among the most important in NATO history, because it definitely decided, after long debates and discussions, which countries to invite to join the Alliance in 1999. The Madrid Summit announced the climax of the NATO enlargement debate and formally invited the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to join NATO and begin accession talks. NATO also stated that the alliance remains open to further accessions.¹⁶²

On December 16, 1997, in an effort to continue implementing the Madrid Summit decisions on NATO enlargement, all sixteen NATO foreign ministries signed with the

¹⁶¹ "North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit Held: Eastern 'Partnership' Pacts Endorsed; Other News." *Facts on File World News Digest*, 13 January 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 3.

¹⁶² Gebhardt von Moltke, "Accession of New Members to the Alliance: What Are the Next Steps? *NATO Review*, No. 4, Vol. 45, July- August 1997, pp. 4-9.

Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary protocols for their accession to NATO.¹⁶³ This also ended the accession talks with these three invitee countries and it marked the beginning of the process of ratification.¹⁶⁴ As of this writing, the accession protocols have already been ratified by the Parliaments of the three invited countries and all 16 NATO countries. On December 1, 1998, the Upper chamber of the Netherlands Parliament, the last Parliament remaining to approve NATO enlargement, signed the accession protocols and completed the ratification process.¹⁶⁵ Accepting President Clinton's invitation for the 1999 NATO Summit in Washington D.C., the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary will receive full NATO membership at the Alliance's 50th anniversary in April 1999.

C. THE US AND NATO OPINION ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

NATO's transformation very often raised questions like: "Whether NATO enlargement is of much importance in the contemporary changing world" and if so, then, "Should NATO be enlarged to include states in Central and Eastern Europe?" Finally, "Will the democratic regimes that are going to replace some of the Communist and

¹⁶³ Javier Solana, "On Course for a NATO of 19 Nations in 1999," *NATO Review*, No. 1, Vol. 46, Spring 1998, pp. 3-5.

¹⁶⁴ "Foreign Minister Hails 'Important Milestone' of NATO Entry." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 18 December 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [30 November 1998], p. 2.

¹⁶⁵ Luboš Palata, "Vstupu do NATO už nebrání žádná překážka (There Is Already No Obstacle Preventing the Entrance to NATO)." 2 December 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/981202> [2 December 1998], p. 1.

authoritarian ones keep Europe peaceful?” In an uneasy post-Cold War era, answering these questions is complicated.

It is very well known that Russia does not support the idea of NATO enlargement, and that it sees that enlargement process as threatening. Contrary to the US and the other NATO’s countries, including its recent applicants, Russia sees NATO enlargement as a step toward destabilizing security in Central and Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, with regard to Russia and NATO, a new chapter in the post-Cold War history of Europe opened on May 27, 1997, when President Clinton and other NATO leaders signed a *Founding Act* of mutual cooperation and security between the alliance and its former Russian adversary, represented by President Boris Yeltsin. The agreement established a new NATO-Russia Council for Consultation on Security, and NATO assured Russia that it had no plans to threaten it.

However, during US President Clinton’s last visit in Moscow, in September 1998, President Yeltsin again strongly expressed a negative position on NATO enlargement to the East, saying that, “In principle, Russia refuses to solve problems by power and also ‘natocentrism’ as a model for European security.”¹⁶⁶

Learning from our history, we can clearly say that a military alliance such as NATO is the only military alliance that has been promoting security, stability, and democracy to secure the democratic gains in Central and Eastern Europe. As many

¹⁶⁶ “Jelcin mluvil zostra proti rozšírení NATO (Yeltsin Spoke Strongly Against Enlargement of NATO).” 3 September 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/980903/mf73029817.html>. [3 September 1998], p. 1.

scholars and NATO supporters argue, functioning democracies across Central and Eastern Europe will prevent another war from descending on the region because it is less likely that democracies will fight against each other.

Why should NATO enlarge if there is not any military threat to Europe today? Just because there is no threat to Europe similar to the ones during WWI, WWII, and the Cold War does not mean that a threat may not exist in the future. The ethnic conflicts in the territories of former Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Kosovo), proved that savage ethnic strife could exist in the heart of Europe. There are new threats in today's world, such as ethnic conflicts, terrorist acts, nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands, drug smuggling, and international crime.

Even though recent studies of NATO advocates predict that the enlargement of NATO will promote democracy and enhance security in Europe, there are still a lot of opponents of NATO enlargement, not only among Russians but also among Americans. For example, George Kennan, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow in 1947 and an expert on US-Soviet relations and the author of the famous "X" article, which defined the U.S. Cold War policy of containment of the Soviet Union for more than forty years, is against NATO enlargement, seeing it as a tragic mistake. He says:

I am strongly against the idea of expanding NATO up to the Russian frontiers. That is the one thing I can think of that would really stir up a truly troublesome nationalistic, military reaction in Russia. My goodness, look at our Monroe Doctrine; every great power is sensitive about having its immediate neighbors connected with another great military power.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ George Kennan, "A Diplomat at Century's End," *U.S. News & World Report*, (1996), p. 41.

He argues that NATO enlargement is the beginning of a new Cold War.¹⁶⁸

In May 1998, before the US Senate approved NATO enlargement, there were also opponents of NATO enlargement among Congressmen. For example, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, Democrat of New York, has recently asserted that NATO enlargement will spark a nuclear war. The Senator said: "NATO enlargement could lead the United States to stumble into the catastrophe of nuclear war with Russia."¹⁶⁹

However, according to recent studies, NATO enlargement will certainly promote stability in Europe by providing a secure environment for new members for further consolidation of democracy and open market economies. As U.S. President Clinton stated, "NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West: prevent a return to local rivalries, strengthen democracy against future threats, and create the conditions for prosperity to flourish."¹⁷⁰ Thus, the following excerpts from *Top Ten Questions on NATO Enlargement* clearly describes four logical and primary reasons for admitting the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO:

¹⁶⁸ Thomas L. Friedman, "Now a World from X," *The New York Times*, (2 May 1998).

¹⁶⁹ Daniel P. Moynihan, "Senate Jousting Starts a Debate on Widening NATO," *The New York Times* (28 April 1998), p. A8.

¹⁷⁰ Bill Clinton, "Top Ten Questions on NATO Enlargement." 19 February, 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_980219_natoqanda.html> [10 September 1998], p. 1.

1) “Enlargement will make NATO stronger and better able to address Europe’s security challenges:”

Adding the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO should give NATO a stronger collective defense capability and reduce the possibility of another major conflict including weapons proliferation, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism in Europe. “As NATO enlarges, more states will share the same responsibility to bear NATO’s core mission” for safeguarding stability and security in the transatlantic area. Each time the Alliance has enlarged, NATO has become stronger.¹⁷¹

2) “Enlargement will strengthen NATO:”

Adding the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO will make the Alliance stronger and better to carry out Europe’s security missions. These three states will add over 200,000 troops (the size of U.S. troop strength reduced in Europe after the end of the Cold War) to NATO. (Poland has a force of 230,000, approximately the size of the forces of the United Kingdom (228,000), and the Czech Republic and Hungary have forces of 57,000 and 60,000, respectively, roughly the size of the armed forces of Portugal (56,000) and Canada (64,830).¹⁷²

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Franklin D. Kramer, “Prepared Statement of Franklin D. Kramer.” *Federal News Service*, 22 October 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [15 April 1998], pp. 1-2.

3) “Enlargement will bolster stability and consolidate democracy in Central Europe:”

Adding the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to NATO will help the Alliance bolster stability and promote democratic trends in Central and Eastern Europe because in order to join NATO, candidates must maintain functioning democracy and a market economy. This means that perspective members will behave in a democratic fashion in order to qualify for NATO membership.

4) “Enlarging NATO will erase Stalin’s artificial dividing line [the Iron Curtain] in Europe.”¹⁷³

While some countries were excluded from the first round of NATO enlargement at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Alliance declared its open-door policy for those future members who meet NATO requirements. This means that the 1999 NATO enlargement will not be the last.

1. Minimum Requirements for Candidates for NATO Membership

It is most likely that the 1999 Washington Summit will not invite or name another “hopeful” country in the second round of NATO membership. However, based on Study on NATO Enlargement¹⁷⁴ and Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO

¹⁷³ “Top Ten Questions on NATO Enlargement.” 19 February, 1998. Available [Online]: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_980219_natoqanda.html [10 September 1998], p. 1.

¹⁷⁴ For more detail implications of NATO membership for new members, including their rights and obligations, and their commitments see “Study on NATO Enlargement,” September 1995. Available [Online]: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/enl-9501.htm> [27 November 1998].

with its open door policy expects to invite other nations to accession negotiation in the coming years. New candidates for NATO membership must meet some minimum requirements. They must:

- a) Uphold democracy and the rule of law, including tolerance for diversity;
- b) Progress toward an open market economic system;
- c) Establish civilian constitutional control of their militaries;
- d) Resolve disputes with neighbors and respect the sovereignty of other nations peacefully;
- e) Respect human rights; and
- f) Develop gradually military capabilities that are congruent and interoperable with NATO systems.¹⁷⁵

However, the most important criterion for invitation to NATO membership is whether they will strengthen the Alliance and increase security and stability in all of Europe.

D. THE CZECH REPUBLIC'S NATO INTEGRATION AFTER 1993

Ever since it came into existence, the Czech Republic has been taking convincing steps to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In its effort, the Czech Republic never expected to act passively in the NATO integration process. Rather, since its independence it has contributed actively to the entire enlargement process. Together with

¹⁷⁵ "Minimum Requirements for NATO Membership," 15 August 1997. Available [Online]: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur> [25 November 1998], p. 1.

its desire to join the European Union, the Czech Republic thus intends to bring its integration efforts to fruition. The government of the Czech Republic is convinced that its membership in NATO will add to the stability and security of the Czech Republic and the whole of Central Europe, and that taking advantage of transatlantic bonds will build a new security system in Europe.

On January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic became a member of the NACC. On March 10, 1994, the Czech Republic joined the PfP program when Prime Minister Václav Klaus signed the PfP project.¹⁷⁶ Jaromír Novotný, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Czech Republic (now, Deputy Minister of Defense for Foreign Affairs), said, “by signing the PfP Framework Document ... the Czech Republic has confirmed its interest in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance.” He saw the Czech Republic participation in PfP program “as a kind of test of maturity for the novices seeking eventual NATO membership.”¹⁷⁷

1. Individual Dialogue between the Czech Republic and NATO

In 1996 and 1997, based on the 1995 study of NATO enlargement requiring new members to share both the benefits and the obligations of NATO membership, NATO conducted individual dialogues with those countries interested in close cooperation with NATO and its membership. Those countries were, for example, Albania, Bulgaria, the

¹⁷⁶ “Discussion on Czech Entry into NATO Started in 1990.” *CTK National News Wire*, 4 November 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], pp. 1-2.

¹⁷⁷ Jaromír Novotný, “The Czech Republic an Active Partner With NATO.” *NATO Review*, No. 3, Vol. 42, June 1994, p.12.

Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The individual dialogue between the Czech Republic and NATO was conducted from May 1996 to April 1997. In 1996, the Czech Republic delegation was headed by the then First Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandr Vondra. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, experts of the Ministry of the Interior and the State Material Reserves Administration took part in all the talks as well. Mr. Gebhardt von Moltke, NATO Deputy General Secretary for Political Affairs, led the NATO team.

The dialogue was supplemented by collective briefings, in which representatives of the partner countries were informed about issues and problems of general interest. Organized by the NATO International Secretariat, the briefings were held on April 18, and May 31, 1996. There were six rounds of the individual dialogue between the Czech Republic and NATO:

- **Round 1** took place in Brussels on May 23, 1996. The main issues for discussion were problems of political-security and military strategies of the Czech Republic, its command structures, and the structure of its armed forces and their organization;
- **Round 2** was held in Brussels on July 11, 1996, to discuss the civilian aspects of membership, defense programs and budgets, intelligence, and intelligence safety;
- **Round 3**, the so-called "Round 2.5," took place in Brussels on July 31, 1996, to discuss problems of military defense policies, the Czech Republic's experience of crisis operations and IFOR, the structure and forces of the CR Army, economic

development of the Czech Republic, and the benefits of the NACC, the PfP program, and regional cooperation;

- **Round 4** took place on October 25, 1996, to deal, in particular, with the defense resources and capacity of the CR Army and state;
- **Round 5** was held on April 7, 1997. Karel Kovanda, Deputy Foreign Minister, headed the Czech Republic delegation. On the agenda were preparations for the NATO Madrid summit meeting, the state of public opinion in the Czech Republic, military expenditure, and the Czech Republic's relations with the Slovak Republic; and
- **Round 6** was the last round of the individual dialogue and took place in Brussels on April 14, 1997. Prime Minister Václav Klaus, headed the Czech Republic delegation who met with the ambassadors to NACC (at 16 plus 1 level). Prime Minister Klaus expressed the Czech Republic's determination to join NATO and complete all its plans and commitments.¹⁷⁸

2. The Czech Government Committee on Integration into NATO

At its meeting on June 25, 1997, the Government of the Czech Republic decided to establish a Committee on Integration of the Czech Republic into NATO. The committee is chaired by Prime Minister Klaus and includes key cabinet members and other government officials. The committee coordinates the Czech Republic's efforts to

¹⁷⁸ [The] Czech Republic Closes First Stage of Joining NATO." *CTK National News Wire*, 7 April 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

become a NATO member. The decision to establish the committee followed the discussion of the report on the individual dialogue between the Czech Republic and NATO. The report identifies the key areas of activities the government will focus on in the process of adjusting the domestic situation to NATO standards.¹⁷⁹

3. The Czech Republic and the NATO Madrid Summit

On July 8, 1997, the summit of NATO member countries in Madrid was one of the most significant milestones in the history of the Czech Republic. From the Czech Republic's point of view, the most significant result of the Madrid Summit was the decision to invite the Czech Republic, together with Poland, and Hungary, to begin its accession talks to the North Atlantic Treaty. During the Madrid NATO meeting, on July 8, 1997, President Havel said:

It is not by chance that, having shaken off Communism, the new democracies of Europe are striving to become members of NATO. They realize that membership is the best tool for a collective European defense, and for the defense of democratic values of states under the rule of law.¹⁸⁰

On December 16, 1997, in response to the Madrid Summit, Foreign Minister Jaroslav Šedivý, representing the Czech Republic, signed in the presence of the 16 Foreign Ministers of NATO member countries and Foreign Ministers of Poland, and Hungary the protocols concerning the accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and

¹⁷⁹ Committee for NATO Integration To Be Established – Zieleniec.” *CTK National News Wire*, 25 June 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [10 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁸⁰ “The Wall Street Journal: Safeguarding Democracy.” 8 July 1997. Available [Online]: <<http://www.stjoseph.org/~swaszak/nato.htm>> [20 October 1998], p. 1.

Hungary, to the North Atlantic Treaty.¹⁸¹ Jaroslav Šedivý stated that the signing of the protocol was an “important milestone in the Czech people’s modern history.”¹⁸²

4. Accession Talks between the Czech Republic and NATO

After the Brussels NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting, from September to November 1997, there were five rounds of accession talks between the Czech Republic and NATO. Karel Kovanda, deputy Foreign Minister, led the delegation of the Czech Republic. All the talks were attended by representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior and Finance, and, depending on the agenda, experts of the Office of the Czech Republic Government and State Material Reserves Administration. The NATO team was headed by Mr. Klaus-Peter Klaiber, Deputy NATO General Secretary for Political Affairs. The five rounds of the accession talks were all held in Brussels:

- **Round 1**, on September 23, 1997, to discuss mainly political issues concerning the Czech Republic’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty;
- **Round 2**, on October 6, 1997, to deal with problems of defense and military structures and participation in collective defense;

¹⁸¹ “1997 Successful Year for Czech Republic’s Integration Plans.” *CTK National News Wire*, 17 December 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁸² “Important Milestone in Czech History – Sedivy.” *CTK National News Wire*, 16 December 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

- **Round 3**, on October 13, 1997. On the agenda were problems of defense resources and participation in joint budgets (civilian, military, and security investments program);
- **Round 4**, on October 23, 1997. These accession talks focused on issues of security information; and
- **Round 5**, on November 10, 1997. The Czech Republic delegation handed over the “Letter of Intent” (LOI) signed by Václav Klaus, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, confirming the interest of the Czech Republic to join NATO and share all its responsibilities. The LOI also stated that the government would contribute to the NATO joint budgets a share of 0.9 percent of the total volume of individual budgets.¹⁸³

On January 21, 1998, the debate on NATO enlargement in the Czech Republic ended with the government approval of the Czech Republic’s accession to NATO. On April 15, 1998, the Czech government’s position on NATO membership was supported by the Czech Parliament, when 154 of 192 members voted for NATO.¹⁸⁴ The vote was 154 to 38. Two weeks later, on April 30, 1998, the Czech Senate voted overwhelmingly for the Czech Republic’s entrance into NATO. The vote was sixty-four to three, far more than

¹⁸³ “Proces integrace ČR do NATO (The Czech Republic Integration Process to NATO),” 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.army.cz/mo/nato/hlavni.htm>> [10 October 1998], p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ “Poslanci velkou většinou schválili připojení k NATO (Members of the Parliament Approved Accession to NATO By Great Majority),” 16 April 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/980416/92441518.html>> [16 April 1998], p. 1.

the two-thirds majority needed to approve the resolution.¹⁸⁵ It was on that same day, April 30, 1998, when the US Senate voted to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by 80 to 19 votes. The US became the fifth of sixteen existing NATO members that approved the NATO ratification document.¹⁸⁶

Since the independence of the Czech Republic, all government coalition parties have been in favor of NATO membership. The Social Democrats advocated having the NATO referendum as a tool for achieving NATO membership, but after the June 1998 Parliamentary elections, Zeman's cabinet finally decided not to have a national referendum on the Czech Republic's entrance into NATO. Since the spring of 1998, the number of determined NATO opponents has decreased, and in September 1998, according to the *Empirical Research Center (STEM)*, about sixty percent of the Czech population would vote for the Czech Republic's accession into NATO.¹⁸⁷

5. The Czech Republic View on NATO Enlargement

For Czechs, Poles and Hungarians, NATO membership does not mean solely a safeguarding of democracy and a guarantee of security in the new post-Cold War era, but also ensures national sovereignty. As Sonia Winter, correspondent for *Radio Free*

¹⁸⁵ Radek Bartoníček. "Senátoři jasně schválili vstup do NATO (Senators Overwhelmingly Approved Entrance to NATO)," 2 May 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/980502/mf67870260.html>> [2 May 1998], p. 1.

¹⁸⁶ "Senate Approves Expansion of NATO in Bipartisan Vote; Clinton Pleased by Decision: 3 Former Enemies." *The New York Times* (1 May 1998), p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ "Pro Vstup do NATO je většina lidí (Majority People Are for the Entrance to NATO)," 22 September 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/980923/mf32471890.html>> [22 September 1998], p. 1.

Europe, wrote, for the three invitee countries, “NATO membership will mean emotional fulfillment of a long-repressed ‘sense of belonging’ to [Western] Europe.”¹⁸⁸

The Czech Republic’s four primary reasons for joining NATO are historical, international-political, military, and economic. According to the Czech Ambassador to the US, Alexander Vondra, who was formerly the Czech Republic’s First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, “the Czech Republic believes [NATO] should be enlarged because, in the past:

- a) “NATO has justified itself as an organization that can guarantee transatlantic bonds;
- b) “NATO does not and never shall lose its purpose (despite the current absence of a clearly defined enemy);
- c) “NATO protects only its members from external threat;
- d) “The Czech people want to share in the responsibility for safeguarding stability and security in the transatlantic area;
- e) “We advocate the same values and are willing to defend them;
- f) “We are convinced that it is more effective and cheaper to guarantee security in cooperation with others;
- g) “Having learned a lesson from the history, we regard the stabilization of Central Europe as the task of our time, and as precondition for stability in all of Europe.”¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁸ Sonia Winter, “NATO Expansion Means More Than Security.” 12 May 1997. Available [Online]: <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/05/F.RU.970512125526.html> [16 September 1998], p. 1.

¹⁸⁹ Alexandr Vondra, “XIIth NATO Workshop on Political-Military Decision Making, Dresden, Germany: The New NATO: Why and How? A Czech View.” 18-22 June 1995. Available [Online]: <http://www.csdr.org/95Book/Vondra.htm> [15 August 1998], p. 2.

E. SLOVAKIA'S NATO INTEGRATION AFTER 1993

The transformation of Slovakia into the Euro-Atlantic organization started when Slovakia became an independent state in 1993.¹⁹⁰ Although Vladimír Mečiar's cabinet in its government program in 1994 declared interest in Slovakia's entry into NATO, HZDS's coalition partner, the Slovak National Party's (SNS) communiqué contains the idea of Slovak neutrality. On August 10, 1998, in his interview for the Czech daily *Právo*, Jan Slota, chairman of the SNS, said:

We do not want to enter some military pacts.... We have learnt from our history that military alliance neither with the West nor with the East has been worthwhile. The British and French threw us out to Hitler in 1939... and after the Second World War II we became slaves of the Eastern powers which itself, for a change, occupied us for twenty years.¹⁹¹

However, since Slovakia became a signatory of Partnership for Peace program (the seventh country of the Central and Eastern country to sign the PfP framework document), it has been very active in meeting its goals to fulfill successfully, in cooperation with all members of NATO and PfP, the necessary requirements for full NATO membership. After the signing ceremony on February 9, 1994, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, during a news conference, Mečiar stated:

¹⁹⁰ "Slovakia Wants to Join NATO – President Says." *CTK National News Wire*, 23 April 1993. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁹¹ Ivan Vilček, "Pro malé národy je optimální neutralita (Neutrality Is Optimal for Small Nations)." 10 August 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafuka.cz/rp/1998/980810/rp050810.html>> [13 August 1998], p. 1.

This offers an opportunity to gradually develop a transeuropean security system based on cooperation and on gradual integration.... This program is one that guarantees security and the opportunity for peace for everybody and creates a space to prevent Europe splitting into two.¹⁹²

One month later, on March 16, 1998, after the Mečiar government fell as a result of a no-confidence vote in the Slovak Parliament, President Kováč named the new government of Jozef Moravčík, which immediately “initiated significant changes in Slovakia’s defense and security policy.” This included establishing democratic civilian control of the military when naming the first civilian Minister of Defense, Pavol Kanis, adapting the organizational structure of Slovak military forces and revising the Defense Doctrine of Slovakia.¹⁹³

1. Slovakia’s Individual Dialogue with NATO

On March 18, 1996, Slovakia, the first country from the Central and Eastern European countries, submitted to the NATO headquarters in Brussels a document which formally begins its individual dialogue with NATO concerning security issues in Central Europe and future membership in that political and military organization.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² “Slovakia Signs NATO Partnership Deal.” *Reuters World Service*, 9 February 1994. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁹³ Jeffrey Simon, “Slovakia: Instability and Special Problems,” *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations*, (Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996), p. 258.

¹⁹⁴ “Foreign Relations; Slovakia Opens Membership Dialogue with NATO.” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 19 March 1996. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

Like the Czech Republic, Slovakia conducted six individual dialogues with NATO in 1996 and 1997:

- **Round 1** took place in Brussels on May 3, 1996. The main goal for discussion was NATO enlargement and its impact on the regional politico-security situation in the new European Security System;
- **Round 2** was held in Brussels on June 25, 1996, to discuss the civilian and military aspects of membership, such as civilian democratic control of the military, military standardization, and legislation on military deployment outside its borders;
- **Round 3** took place in Brussels on October 16, 1996. On the agenda were issues of nuclear policy, the NATO enlargement process and the issue of economic development in Slovakia;
- **Rounds 4 and 5** were held in Brussels on April 10, 1997. These individual dialogues focused on issues of Slovakia's privatization, national minorities, the Slovak-Hungarian relationship, and Slovak democratic institutions; and
- **Round 6** was the last round of individual dialogue before the NATO Madrid Summit. This round took place in Brussels on April 17, 1997, and on the agenda were issues dealing with the NATO enlargement and preparations for decisions in Madrid.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ "Slovakia and NATO." 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.foreign.gov.sk/page_nato.htm> [3 September 1998], pp. 1-6.

2. Slovakia and the NATO Madrid Summit

After years of political instability and intrigues and the failure of the referendum on NATO membership, in 1997, that was invalidated because of government interference in the balloting, Slovakia has sent a negative signal to NATO and the EU countries and Slovakia's case for early membership was weakened. This led to a verdict of Slovakia's exclusion from the first wave of NATO enlargement declared by the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit.

While Romania and Slovenia were mentioned as other possibilities, Slovakia was not discussed "anywhere in the document. As one of the Visegrád Four ... invited to join NATO, Slovakia was once regarded as a strong candidate for NATO membership."¹⁹⁶ Ambassador Johnson openly blamed Slovakia's denial of membership on activities taken by Vladimir Mečiar's government.

When Slovakia was excluded from the first wave of NATO enlargement in the NATO Madrid Summit on July, 8, 1998, former Slovak President Michal Kováč said,

I don't view [the exclusion of Slovakia from the first wave of EU and NATO expansion] as a rejection of Slovakia.... What was rejected was the policy of the current Slovak government, especially those policies having to do with... implementing democratic principles.... Slovakia still has a chance.... But not with Mečiar and not with Mečiar's policy.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Siegfried Morkowitz, "Slovakia Out in Cold at NATO Summit." *The Prague Post*, 19 February 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

¹⁹⁷ Siegfried Morkowitz, "Western Snubs Costly for Slovakia," *The Prague Post*, 19 February 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], pp. 1-2.

Indeed, NATO sent a clear signal (minimal requirements) for those countries interested in NATO membership that: the real factors governing enlargement are mainly political (not the military compatibility of weapons), a stable democratic system, good relations with neighbors, democratic civilian control of the military, guaranteed human rights, and a state market economy.¹⁹⁸ While the Czech Republic meets all of these requirements, Slovakia appears to be lacking in most of those areas. Slovakia did not fulfill the NATO criteria in the political and social field.

However, after Mečiar's defeat, Slovakia's isolation ended. According to Jan Kavan, the Czech Foreign Minister, "Slovakia would now be welcome to join the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians in the Visegrád Group, which co-ordinates their applications to join NATO and the EU."¹⁹⁹

F. WHY THE CZECH REPUBLIC WAS INVITED TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE

As I already discussed, regarding US and NATO opinions on NATO enlargement and the minimal requirements for NATO's applicants, the Czech Republic will certainly contribute to the security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe.

¹⁹⁸ "Survey of Slovak Press." *CTK National News Wire*, 2 May 1996. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 2.

¹⁹⁹ Martin Walker, "Czechs Welcome New Slovakia." *The Guardian*, 30 September 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [19 November 1998], p. 1.

By admitting new members NATO will make itself better able to address Europe's new security challenges. Enlargement will foster democratic reforms and stability, strengthen NATO's capacity for collective defense, promote regional harmony, spread NATO's burdens more broadly, help avoid a destabilizing zone of insecurity and instability in Europe and create a better Central and East European climate for market growth and prosperity.²⁰⁰

According to Dr. Franklin D. Kramer, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs:

The Czech Republic has served as a political role model for Central and Eastern Europe. It has made great progress in establishing broad democratic control over its armed forces; it is fully dedicated to a free, open market economy and since 1989 it has been a fully functioning democracy. The Czech Republic has also cultivated close ties with all its neighbors... and the Czechs have no conflicts with neighboring countries relating to minority ethnic groups. Since the Madrid Summit, Prague has also increased its trilateral regional defense cooperation with Warsaw and Budapest.... Bilaterally, the Czechs have also contributed to the security of Central Europe by resolving historical disputes and developing close ties with Germany.²⁰¹

In sum, during his visit to the Czech city of Hradec Králové, on April 16, 1998, Alexander Vershbow, the American Ambassador to NATO, speaking about Czech membership in NATO stated:

²⁰⁰ "Report to Congress on NATO Enlargement." 24 February 1997. Available [Online]: <<http://www.usia.gov/topical/pol/atlcomm/9702nato.htm>> [27 May 1998], p. 3.

²⁰¹ Franklin D. Kramer, "Prepared Statement of Franklin D. Kramer." *Federal News Service*, 23 October 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [9 September 1998], p. 3.

The United States supported membership for the Czech Republic in NATO because the Czech Republic was ready and committed to assume the associated rights and responsibilities of membership in the Alliance.²⁰²

By admitting the Czech Republic and other new members, NATO will become better able to deal with all potential security uncertainties and with today's threats to all its members and beyond. Then, by enlarging with the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, NATO will better contribute to the security of Central Europe.

G. CONCLUSION

Four years ago, when Czechoslovakia peacefully split into the Czech and Slovak republics, Slovakia was among the four front-runners to be part of NATO's first round of enlargement. But Slovakia was dropped from the enlargement process because of Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Mečiar's on-going political failure to move his country down the path toward democracy.

The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, answering a journalist question why Slovakia was excluded from NATO membership, stated, that the reason why the Slovak Republic was not among the first countries to be invited to join NATO in the first round is that Slovakia did not meet NATO's membership criteria. She said:

²⁰² Alexander Vershbow, "NATO Enlargement and the Czech Republic." 16 April 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.nato.int/usa/speech/s980416a.htm>> [24 August 1998], p. 6.

It had not met a number of the criteria... and among those are a functioning market system, a functioning democracy, the control of the civilian over the military, and... the determination was made that at this time, Slovakia was not [qualified].²⁰³

²⁰³ "Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the New Atlantic Initiative on NATO Enlargement." *Federal News Service*, 9 February 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [15 August 1998], p. 7.

V. CONCLUSION

*If the West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West. If principles of democracy win in the East, the peace and stability of all Europe will be ensured.*²⁰⁴ -- Václav Havel

Despite a long ensured tradition of the Czech lands and Slovakia being a part of western European culture, more than forty years of Communist rule under the influence of the Soviet Union substantially changed not only the character of the Czech and Slovak nations but also the access of the West to both countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Since 1993, Slovakia has differed from its neighbors and other former post-Communist countries in Central and European Europe in many negative aspects. Foremost on Slovakia's list of negatives was Mečiar's four-year leadership with several politico-economic scandals, as well as machination with the constitution, and unethical control over the media, intelligence services, and other bureaucracies. Also, in Slovakia the opposition parties, coalitions, and movements were ostracized from political life into the role of outsider. In addition, Mečiar's government failed to investigate the kidnapping of former president Michal Kováč's son. The kidnappers were given amnesty by Mečiar immediately after he took over most of the presidential rights in March 1998,

²⁰⁴ Václav Havel, "The Euro-American Alliance Needs to Deepen as It Expands." *International Herald Tribune*, 15 May 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/CURNWS [19 November 1998], p. 2.

when Kováč's presidential term expired. Another highly negative aspect of this leadership was the unconstitutional manipulation of the May 1997 referendum on NATO and on direct presidential elections. Finally, there also was the exclusion of Parliamentary deputy František Gaulieder from the Parliament in 1996.

Although the Western democracies criticized Mečiar's government for its failures from the very beginning, the frustrated referendum on NATO membership and direct presidential elections in May 1997 was considered a turning point in the anti-democratic development in Slovakia and will never be erased from Slovakia's history. Unlike the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, Slovakia was not invited to join NATO in the first round of its enlargement in the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit, and it has also failed to be included in the first group of six countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, and Cyprus, which were invited for accession talks on entry into the European Union. Also it failed to become a member of the OECD. Instead of reorganizing his leadership, Mečiar and his cabinet blamed the minority opposition for these failures as well as for double standards implemented by NATO and the EU on Slovakia and its neighbors.

Slovakia under Mečiar's authoritarian leadership from 1990-91, 1992-94 and from 1994-98 was driven from democratic Europe into international isolation and a dictatorial regime under the one party rule of the HZDS.

In voting for a new Slovak Parliament in September 1998, a majority of Slovaks registered their disapproval of those dangerous antidemocratic trends and gave their backing to the SDK coalition of pro-Western and democracy parties. Slovakia's isolation

from the western communities would create different levels of security that could reignite tension between Slovakia and neighboring Hungary and the Czech Republic and decrease Slovakia's economic potential. In May 1997, before the Madrid Summit, France's ambassador in Bratislava stated that, "If you isolate Slovakia, you will encourage the most nationalist forces.... Excluding Slovakia from NATO will just help the undemocratic trends."²⁰⁵ Isolated Slovakia would not be able to participate in all-important NATO and EU meetings focusing on significant changes of its member's militaries, politics and economics, which would have a fundamental impact in the entire region.

The beginning of its negotiations which NATO and the EU will depend on Slovakia's ability to remove from its political and economic life the impact of Mečiarism and Mečiar's heritage. Slovakia's new government is confident that the immense international relief at former Prime Minister Mečiar's departure will help eliminate Slovakia's isolation and return the country to the intensive process of NATO, EU, and OECD integration.

The composition of the Dzurinda cabinet itself answered one of NATO's and the EU's primary reservations about Slovakia's path to democracy—insufficient protection of the rights of ethnic minorities. The Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK), representing a Hungarian minority of more than 600,000 is a partner of the new government, whose

²⁰⁵ "NATO Expansion Could Spur European Rift; As Ex-Allies Are Split into Haves and Have-Nots, Tension in Central Europe Is a Real Possibility." *Chicago Tribune*, 29 May 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [30 October 1998], p. 3.

representatives hold the newly-created deputy prime minister's post for minority rights. All four coalition parties have pledged to pass a law on minority languages and minority media quickly. However the main task for Dzurinda's government in the upcoming years is to make sure that the anti-Mečiar alliance, the Slovak Democratic Coalition, stays united.

Even though no time table has been set for a further NATO enlargement, Slovakia now has a good chance of catching up with its neighboring countries, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, in being admitted to NATO and the EU. Certainly, Slovakia's further isolation and the country's exclusion from the next group of applicants for NATO and EU enlargement could have brought several negative consequences, such as a worsening of Slovakia's international position, foreign policy and economic orientation to the East (thereby losing opportunities for rapid economic and social development in cooperation with Western nations), and an increased Russian impact on Slovakia's development.

However, after the radical changes on Slovakia's post-election scene, the country's political situation still remains far from clear. Unless the new Slovak government, headed by Mikuláš Dzurinda, can effect a smooth transition of centralized power to a healthy competitive one and prove that Slovakia has a functioning democracy, integration into Western European structures, especially Slovakia's entrance into NATO and the EU, may not happen.

A. WHAT SLOVAKIA SHOULD DO TO JOIN NATO AND THE EU

First of all, Slovakia must show its long-term-commitment to the principles of a stable and rooted democracy. Even though the cabinet of Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar has stated that the membership in NATO and the EU is Slovakia's top foreign policy priority, they chose the wrong path to NATO and the EU. This cannot be corrected with only several months of radical changes. However, a correction can happen after several years of intensive political, social, and economic reforms.

Slovakia's military preparedness was judged to have been among the best of the candidates and is not considered an obstacle to NATO membership. For instance, Terence Taylor, assistance director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, said:

Slovakia is as well-prepared as any of the other countries.... But that's not the point that will prevent NATO expansion. There's not actually a set of military criteria, only political criteria.²⁰⁶

Slovak politicians caused Slovakia's exclusion from all Euro-Atlantic organizations.²⁰⁷ However, the image of Slovakia's politics has changed. The 1998 September Parliamentary elections have changed Slovakia rapidly and the new Slovak government led by Prime Minister Dzurinda appears to have brightened Slovakia's

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁰⁷ "Army Chief Says Military Not to Blame for Country's Exclusion from NATO." *BBC Summary of World Broadcast*, 11 July 1997. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPEAN/ALLNWS [30 October 1998], p.1.

prospects of integration to NATO and the EU. Today, Slovakia's return to the integration process depends purely on concrete political changes.

The main issues for Slovakia are discussed below. The biggest problem of Slovak politics—the establishment of a new *democratic* Slovak government—seems to be already solved, but there are many other problems concerning Slovak politics that still have to be addressed before Slovakia integrates with the Western democracies:

1) Slovaks must elect a head of the state to avoid constitutional crisis:

There were concerns about the long-term tensions existing between the government and the president exemplified in the extreme personal antagonism between Prime Minister Mečiar and President Kováč that has poisoned the political atmosphere in Slovakia for the past four years. When President Kováč's term expired on March 2, 1998, Slovakia plunged into a constitutional crisis. By electing a new Slovak president, Slovakia can easily avoid possible constitutional crises.

The Coalition party agreed on a joint candidate for president, Rudolf Schuster, mayor of Košice and founder of the SOP, to be elected under current Parliamentary rules. However, based on the Dzurinda's government decision, the presidential election is to be direct. At least two candidates, Rudolf Schuster and former President of Slovakia Michal Kováč, will run for election to the vacant presidential post.²⁰⁸ Former Prime Minister Mečiar decided not to run for this post.

²⁰⁸ "Chci být opět prezidentem Slovenska, potvrdil Kováč (I Want to Be president again, Kováč Confirmed)." 25 November 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/981125/mf29867340.html>> [25 November 1998], p. 1.

2) Any violation of the law and constitution must be investigated and the guilty brought to justice:

The Slovak Constitutional Court has repeatedly ruled in favor of the opposition in politically delicate affairs, such as the abduction of former President Michal Kováč's son to Austria, and the exclusion of František Gaulieder, a former member of the HZDS. This relates also to all the political crimes related to the kidnapping of President Michal Kováč's son, as well as to the murder of Robert Remiáš, allegedly at the hands of the Slovak intelligence service (SIS), regardless of the Mečiar amnesty. Only when all of these violations of the law and constitution are prosecuted, will the Slovaks once again trust in its governmental administrative bodies.

3) Effective Parliamentary control over the secret service, the SIS, must be reestablished and SIS must be subordinated to the Ministry of Interior:

There was inadequate control of the secret services by the civilian authorities. The Parliamentary security committee must receive regular information about SIS activities to avoid the misuse of the secret service politically.

4) Complete the establishment of effective democratic civilian control of the military and do not allow the civilian leadership to politicize the military:

The Slovak government must keep an apolitical military to avoid any attempts to use the military to gain political goals.

5) Insufficient protection of ethnic minorities must be corrected, and a new law on minority language must be passed:

The new government must take appropriate steps to restore all ethnic groups' trust in governmental institutions. These institutions must serve primarily in favor of all Slovaks citizens to protect their rights.

6) A new law on Parliamentary elections as well as a law on state-owned media must be passed:

A new law on freedom of the press and Parliamentary election must be approved. This is one of the most important factors determining whether a state democracy is consolidated or not.

7) Reestablish a dialog with the democratic West, the United States, and members of the European Union:

Slovakia must escape Mečiar's foreign isolation and its negative reputation among Western democracies. With intensive individual dialogues with Western institutions like NATO, the EU, the WEU, the OSCE, and the UN, Slovakia will improve its image and better prepare for another wave of NATO enlargement.

8) Review the Slovak-Russia agreements and improve the current foreign policy and diplomacy:

First of all, Slovakia must rationally review its previous agreement with those powers that do not want to see it fully integrated with the West. For example, according to the daily newspaper *SME*, Slovakia confirmed it would revise all its agreements with Russia. As some Slovak officials noted, some of these agreements could be an obstacle to Slovak membership in NATO. In 1996, former Russia Ambassador to Slovakia, S.

Jastrzembskij, stated that for the last forty months, "our countries agreed on more than 70 inter-departmental agreements."²⁰⁹

9) Reestablish a good relationship with neighboring countries:

Slovakia as a small country of only five million people is dependent on good relations with its neighboring country. In 1997, after its permanently tense relations with its southern neighbor, Hungary, Slovakia started to spoil its good relations with its western neighbor, the Czech Republic. Reestablishing a good relationship with its neighbors, Slovakia, in its effort to join NATO and the EU, needs a closer relationship with at least one strong regional partner. In November 1998, Slovak Prime Minister Dzurinda, after his first visit in Brussels, went to Poland and declared that Poland is a strategic partner of his country.²¹⁰

10) Intensively cooperate with the Visegrád Group:

Radical changes in Slovakia's political scene which came immediately after the 1998 September Parliamentary elections, led Czech President Václav Havel to call for a 1999 Spring Visegrád Group Summit in Bratislava, Slovakia, to support Slovakia's effort in NATO and the EU integration. This idea was also supported by two other Visegrád Group's members. During Václav Havel's visit to Slovakia on November 7, 1998, Slovak Prime Minister Dzurinda stated, "The regional table which is trying to integrate into

²⁰⁹ "J. Figel' potvrdil revíziu zmlúv s Ruskom, podľa S. Kozlika táto bublina spľane (J. Figel' Confirmed a Revision of Agreements with Russia, According to S. Kozlišk, This Bubble Deflates)." 16 November 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.sme.sk/aarticle.asp?dat=456&id=66343>> [17 November 1998], p. 1.

²¹⁰ "Slovensko môže dohnat v NATO Rumuny (Slovakia can catch up with Romania in NATO)." 13 November 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/981113/mf74526197.html>> [14 November 1998], p. 1.

western structure has four legs [i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic] and Mister President did not forget it.”²¹¹

11) Show that Slovakia is not looking for NATO membership only because of its benefits but that it wants to contribute to the security in the Central and Eastern European region:

Slovakia has to demonstrate that over the long term it will undoubtedly contribute to the security of Central and Eastern Europe and meet all its commitments for NATO enlargement.

12) Intensify the individual negotiations and cooperation with NATO:

Slovakia must continue to participate in the Partnership for Peace program and Joint Combined Exercises with NATO countries, as well as enhance cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the OSCE, and the WEU. The first step has already been taken when the Alliance invited Slovakia to intensive the individual dialogue with Brussels.²¹²

13) Recovery and stabilization of the market economy;

Continuing privatization of state companies and banks must be transparent. Foreign debt more than doubled during the Mečiar period through a costly economic policy of heavy foreign loans with enormously high interest rates. “Slovakia will need

²¹¹ “Havel navrhl v Bratislavě oživení visegrádské čtyřky (Havel Suggested Revive Visegrad Four in Bratislava).” 9 November 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/mf/1998/981109/mf22703070.html>>, [9 November 1998], p. 1.

²¹² “Dzurinda: Aliance zve Slovensko k rozhovorům (Dzurinda: Alliance Invites Slovakia to a Dialog).” 13 November 1998. Available [Online]: <<http://www.trafika.cz/ln/1998/981113/ln40841616.html>> [14 November 1998], p. 1.

over 100 billion [Slovak crowns] Sk [\$2.9 million] a year in direct foreign investment to revitalize the deteriorated economy." According to the weekly, *The Prague Post*, "Slovakia's foreign indebtedness through the end of June totaled \$11.3 billion."²¹³

Having given some of these above mention recommendations and reform proposals, we can observe recently that Slovakia has taken some steps to repair its reputation. As the new government declared, it seems that Slovakia led by the new Prime Minister Dzurinda has really speeded up its effort to catch up with its Visegrád Group partners. According to the Slovak government's program, Slovakia's priority goals are to gain OECD membership, integration into the first wave of the European Union, and membership in NATO. Dzurinda, began by reestablishing basic democratic principles and started to look at internal political problems. On November 10, 1998, after he returned to Slovakia from his first international visit to meet high NATO and EU officials in Brussels, on November 6 and 7, 1998, Mikuláš Dzurinda spoke to the members of the Slovak National Council declaring that though Slovakia would probably miss the first wave of NATO and EU enlargement, it had not lost support for later integration. He stated that:

²¹³ Ron Orol, "Investing Debt Out of Slovakia." 7 October 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.praguepost.cz/busi100798c.html> [10 August 1998], p. 1.

The hands of the clock cannot be turned back—for instance, back to November 1994. That is why we cannot wonder how our neighbors, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic which stood on the same starting line with us, got so far ahead of us in the NATO integration. However, Slovakia, in its effort in NATO integration, received full support from the Alliance. Our partners are prepared to cooperate with us.... The main steps have to be made here, at home, in our country, by us. This means to restore a spirit of democracy, government of law, to reform a distorted... economy, to make our administration more effective, to pass good laws. This is a role for all of us. Because I do not know any other way for our country to enter the area of peace, stability and prosperity of the European unity.²¹⁴

On November 27, 1998, after his second meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and a meeting with the NATO Council of ambassadors, Mikuláš Dzurinda, the new Prime Minister of Slovakia, said in Brussels,

I am aware that we cannot expect an early invitation, not at the summit in Washington, but we will knock strongly on NATO's door afterwards.... Slovakia would prove in the forthcoming three or four months that it has a stable and entirely democratic government.... Slovakia would be interested in an early admission, even individual, and.... Slovakia would like to join the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in this because the four countries launched their NATO bid together in 1991.²¹⁵

These are some of the challenges which Slovakia must master. Whether Slovakia succeeds in achieving these goals mainly depends on the stability and unity of Dzurinda's

²¹⁴ "Vystúpenie predsedu vlády Mikuláša Dzurindu na 3. schôdzi Národnej rady Slovenskej republiky (Prime Minister Address to the 3rd meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic)." 10 November 1998. Available [Online]: <http://www.government.gov.sk/LISTA/sk_frame_materialy_uvsr.shtml> [30 November 1998], p. 1.

²¹⁵ "Slovakia to Push Hard for NATO Admission after April Summit." *CTK National News Wire*, 27 November 1998. Available [Lexis-Nexis]: EUROPE/ALLNWS [1 December 1998], p. 1.

cabinet. Any problems, even small ones, inside the government coalition, could return Slovakia to the Mečiar's epoch.

Slovakia must continue in its reforms in order to stay on the path of integration and reconciliation. The countries of NATO and the European Union countries, that believe in Slovakia's effort to enter the Euro-Atlantic integration, should be asked to help Slovakia realize its goals. With a deepened cooperation and intensive political individual dialogue through an enhanced Partnership for Peace program and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, Slovakia would once again be a candidate for a future wave of NATO enlargement. Having Slovakia together with the three Visegrád Group countries would make Central Europe more secure, safer, and more stable. To make Central Europe stable, safe, and prosperous means that all of its members must meet these objectives. This will be a challenge for the twenty-first century.

Yet if Slovakia is unable to catch up with the Czech Republic and the other two countries of the Visegrád group in the process of the first wave of NATO and the EU integration, it should not be forgotten and relegated as an outsider country. Slovakia should use its collected experiences to push itself ahead of the other nations which are awaiting the beginning of the intensive talks on NATO and the EU integration.

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